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Evaluation is creation: hear it, you creators! Evaluating 
is itself the most valuable treasure of all that we value. 
It is only through evaluation that value exists: and 
without evaluation the nut of existence would be hollow. 
 
--Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra
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SUMMARY 
 
Organizational development is a central purpose of 
evaluation.  Disasters and other emergency situations carry 
with them significant implications for evaluation, given 
that they are often unanticipated and involve multiple 
relief efforts on the part of INGOs, governments and 
international organizations.  Two particularly common 
reasons for INGOs to evaluate disaster relief efforts are 
1) accountability to donors and 2) desire to enhance the 
organization’s response capacity.  This thesis endeavors 
briefly to review the state of the evaluation field for 
disaster relief so as to reflect on how it needs to go 
forward.  The conclusion is that evaluation of disaster 
relief efforts is alive and well.  Though evaluation for 
accountability seems fairly straightforward, determining 
just how the evaluation influences the organization and 
beyond is not.   
Evaluation use has long been a central thread of 
discussion in evaluation theory, with the richer idea of 
evaluation influence only recently taking the stage.  
Evaluation influence takes the notion of evaluation use a 
few steps further by offering more complex, subtle, and 
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sometimes unintentional ways that an evaluation might 
positively better a situation.  This study contributes to 
the very few empirical studies of evaluation influence by 
looking at one organization in depth and concluding that 
evaluation does influence in useful ways.
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
Evaluation as a form of research is a practical 
endeavor, manifested in action. Whether evaluation succeeds 
in ameliorating the practice of the organizations that 
employ it is a question that is gaining in relevance for 
non-profits as individuals, corporations, and governments 
increase their calls for greater accountability. At its 
very root, the word ‘evaluation’ means ‘to seek out the 
value of;’(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2007) when an 
organization evaluates its policies or programs, by 
definition it is looking to determine value.  It is not 
surprising, then, that the concept of use, or the newer and 
more apt concept of influence, receives such enduring 
attention in the evaluation literature.  As an enterprise 
that purportedly exposes the value of a policy or program, 
evaluation can generate concern over what its consequences 
will be.   
In the past two decades, both donors and the public 
have called for higher and higher standards of 
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accountability in international and domestic nonprofits. 
Evaluation, consequently, has come under the spotlight as a 
means to that end. The lingering question is whether the 
influence of evaluation on an organization is merely 
“window-dressing”, whether it includes or is limited to 
accountability.  Nonprofits, working with limited 
resources, cannot afford for evaluation to be ineffective.  
This paper addresses the question of how the evaluation 
process and evaluation reports affect (or do not affect) 
the practice in a large well-known non-profit organization 
and identifies the factors that expose these influences. 
Evaluation use, or utilization, has been prevalent in 
the evaluation literature for a few decades and refers to a 
change resulting from an evaluation or an evaluation 
report. Evaluators or organizations commissioning 
evaluations often place high priority on using findings for 
program improvement or, more broadly, to inform decision-
making.  Use has been a central theoretical theme both for 
evaluation and for research-generated knowledge.  However, 
organizations often do not have formal mechanisms for 
assessing whether their evaluations are used effectively or 
not, and virtually none have a systematic means for 
identifying indirect or unintended consequences of 
evaluation.  In the case of nonprofits, this could be due 
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in part to limited resources; moreover, those donating to 
nonprofits might prefer a more “direct” use of their money 
than meta-evaluation activities.  
In the evaluation literature, the term ‘use,’ and its 
sister ‘utilization,’  have given way to the broader 
‘influence’ (Henry & Mark, 2003; Kirkhart, 2000) in more 
recent theoretical musings on evaluation.  This shift 
reflects the limitations, semantic and otherwise, of the 
concept of use, and opens the door for unintended and 
subtle consequences of evaluating within an organization.  
Few organizations have studied formally the instance(s) of 
evaluation influence; perhaps this is in part because the 
factors leading to an evaluation’s influence are poorly 
understood. Henry and Mark (2003) tackle this in examining 
the mechanisms which, for them, undergird the instances of 
influence. A better understanding of these mechanisms, and 
concrete examples, will go a long way toward helping 
evaluators to dissect how it is that evaluations 
potentially influence, and under what circumstances.  This 
study contributes toward developing that understanding of 
the mechanisms leading to evaluation influence by exploring 
the extent to which an evaluation’s influence can be 
anticipated or planned for prior to the evaluation’s being 
carried out. 
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The twenty-first century has seen technological 
advances, cultural trends, political situations, and 
globalization unimaginable one hundred years ago. In this 
short time frame, humanitarian response to natural 
disasters and other emergencies has increased rapidly.  
Disasters and conflicts themselves, of course, have been 
occurring for thousands of years.  But never has disaster 
media exposure made more individuals – and donors – aware 
of the extent of devastation in disasters than in this 
century.  With this added awareness comes an increase in 
money flow and in response.  While greater emergency 
response is a welcome development, it brings with it a host 
of new challenges, such as being accountable for 
responsible use of donor funds, standards for training of 
crisis respondents, and timing of assistance, 
communications, and security.     
Among the most critical challenges for a humanitarian 
aid agency, such as an INGO (international non-governmental 
organization), is the dilemma of how to measure its impact 
on a disaster scene.  This problem becomes murkier still 
when aid agencies look to use evaluation findings to 
improve their efforts for responding to the next disaster.  
This paper examines the influence, intended and otherwise, 
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of humanitarian relief evaluation findings in practice and 
in organizational policy-making.   
1.2 Research Problem 
 
 In view of the 2004 Asian tsunami and other high-
profile emergencies such as the present crisis in Darfur, 
international humanitarian aid agencies offer a rich forum 
for examining evaluation influence on an agency’s practice.  
Not only are such agencies grappling with how to use an 
unprecedented amount of aid money responsibly and 
effectively, but they are in the business of saving lives.  
Neglecting to employ the recommendations from an evaluation 
report could literally be a matter of life and death.  
These agencies have been facing mounting pressure from 
donors and governments to strengthen their accountability 
practices and ensure transparency.  As a result, 
humanitarian aid agencies are more and more frequently 
obliged to conduct an evaluation as part of their 
programming.  The question is whether evaluations go beyond 
fulfilling donors’ accountability documentation requests 
and affect agency programs and policies.  
 In the 1990s, a profusion of large-scale humanitarian 
crises captured the world’s attention.  Notably, media 
coverage of the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi awakened the 
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public to the urgency of the human suffering there.  The 
famine that befell conflict-ridden Somalia similarly 
required a substantial response from the international 
humanitarian assistance community.  The upheaval in Bosnia 
exposed a need not just for relief and refugee assistance, 
but also for rebuilding and development.  These events and 
others sparked large-scale and visible responses from 
INGOs. Significantly, the money flowing to aid agencies 
from governments and from private sources meant a greater 
call for responsibility on the part of the INGOs whose 
programming depended on those funding venues. Furthermore, 
INGOs, who often had an established presence in a crisis 
area prior to the emergency response, began to partner with 
the United Nations and with bilateral donor agencies for 
service delivery and coordination.  These relationships 
increased the clamor for evaluation of emergency programs 
(Wood, 2001). Public concern for INGOs’ comportment grew, 
with a corresponding demand for better accountability 
(Ebrahim, 2003b). The number of INGOs increased as well 
during that period. Though a spate of literature existed at 
that point on evaluation theory and practice, little of it 
addressed the unique needs and characteristics of the 
humanitarian aid agency.  
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Types of donors to humanitarian assistance 
organizations range from governments to INGOs to 
individuals. Government money for humanitarian aid is often 
channeled through government agencies established for this 
purpose, as with the United States Agency for International 
Aid (USAID) in the U.S. or the Department for International 
Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom.  Money designated 
for emergencies or disasters is usually coupled with 
development aid budgets (Cahill, 2003). Donor money sources 
include tax dollars, corporate and individual 
contributions, and in-kind assistance. As the amount of 
public and private aid has exploded in the last decade, so, 
too, has the number and variety of INGOs and other agencies 
working in emergency relief.  The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Food 
Programme (WFP) collaborate with INGOs to provide 
coordination and direction to large-scale relief efforts.  
The International Red Cross is a familiar figure in these 
scenarios.  Upstart INGOs join the pool in seeking funding 
and publicity with every disaster.  However, as of the late 
90s, there were eight INGOs vying for and receiving over 
half the total relief money: the Cooperative for Assistance 
and Relief Everywhere (CARE), Save the Children, World 
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Vision International, the Oxford Committee for Famine 
Relief (Oxfam), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, or Doctors 
Without Borders), European Solidarity Towards Equal 
Participation of People (Eurostep), Coopération 
International pour le Développement et le Solidarité 
(CIDSE), and Association of Protestant Development 
Organizations in Europe (APDOVE) (Simmons, 1998).  If they 
are receiving relief money from the same sources, they are 
also receiving similar pressure to hold themselves 
accountable for their decisions and actions. 
Simmons (1998)likens the competition among INGOs vying 
for funds and media attention to a market system; Smillie 
and Minear (2004)similarly label it an enterprise.  This 
image of aid agencies as “corporations” in a “market” hints 
at the potential for competitive interaction between 
organizations and underscores the importance of 
transparency and of organizations holding themselves 
accountable for their “bottom line.”  INGOs, regardless of 
common aims such as a desire to reach the greatest number 
of people as efficiently as possible, compete amongst each 
other both for funds and for share of the relief spotlight 
in the media.  The perceived commercial character of the 
INGO sector has provoked criticism in terms of how INGOs 
operate and what motivates those who work for them 
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(Dichter, 1999; Fowler, 1997). This criticism further 
emphasizes the importance of accountability and evaluation 
for INGOs that face pressure to show how efficient they 
have been with donated funds. 
1.2.1 Disaster-specific Evaluation Standards 
 
The attention to the importance of accountability 
heightened in the 1990s in tandem with the increased 
humanitarian relief response to a series of crises, but was 
by no means a new issue of concern for INGOs.  INGOs have 
long faced criticism for not making accountability a 
priority; the very word “non-“ in non-governmental 
organization suggests that INGOs are not beholden to 
governments, nor bound by their regulations, in the way 
that corporations, government agencies, or even domestic 
nonprofits might be (I. Smillie, 1997).  The nature of INGO 
work makes it notoriously difficult to evaluate: it is one 
thing for a corporation to use sales as a benchmark for 
product success, quite another for an INGO to measure a 
concept so nebulous as “empowerment” in concrete terms.  
This is especially true for INGOs working in humanitarian 
relief, because often the problems they address are not 
only complex, but also unanticipated; in a crisis 
situation, obtaining baseline data can be daunting or 
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downright impossible.   The emphasis on accountability 
resulting from the wave of emergencies and crisis response 
funding in the 1990s brought to light a need for setting 
widely applicable minimum standards for emergency response.  
Five organizations or consortiums have attempted to address 
this need through developing guidelines both for planning 
and for evaluation.  Their foci range in breadth from 
crisis identification and preparedness to post-crisis 
learning and reflection.  These initiatives profess to be 
complementary to each other, rather than competitive, in 
function:  
1.2.1.1 The Red Cross Code of Conduct 
 
 In 1994, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement sought the assistance of established INGO networks 
to draw up a Code of Conduct for those agencies working in 
emergency relief.  The Code of Conduct is designed to 
recognize the internal and external pressures that INGOs 
face in responding effectively and responsibly to 
emergencies.  It is not intended as a mechanism through 
which to sanction those who agree to it but fail to comply 
with it; rather, it is a professional guideline.  Eight of 
the largest disaster relief agencies signed on to the Code 
of Conduct at its inception in 1994, and many more have 
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since; it aims to be applicable to small and large agencies 
alike.  The Code of Conduct is not so much an evaluation 
measure or tool as it is a statement of an acceptable 
behavior. 
1.2.1.2 The Sphere Project 
 
 Sphere, initiated in 1997, is a collaborative effort 
on the part of several international NGOs and the 
International Red Cross. The project is predicated on the 
notion of the human right to dignity.  This, for Sphere, 
translates to a right to assistance for those whom a 
disaster affects.  Its main products are a humanitarian 
charter, a framework for quality and accountability in 
humanitarian assistance, and a handbook of tools for 
assuring quality in four areas of response:  
• water sanitation and hygiene 
• nutrition and food aid 
• shelter  
• health.   
 
The handbook, The Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum 
Standards in Disaster Response, aims to improve 
accountability and quality of service provision.  Each 
standard has key indicators and guidance notes.  The 
handbook was adopted in 1997 and revised in 2004.  Sphere 
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targets the practitioner and is more of an implementation 
tool than an evaluation guide.   
 Sphere is noted for taking a “rights-based” approach 
to disaster response.  The rights-based approach, as 
compared to a needs-based approach, focuses on 
acknowledging basic human rights as opposed to needs-based 
service delivery.  In other words, rather than approaching 
disaster response as fundamentally addressing a need, such 
as drinking water, Sphere approaches disaster response as 
addressing a human right, such as the right to adequate 
food and water. The rights-based approach endures criticism 
for not getting to the heart of the political context 
surrounding a crisis (Hilhorst, 2002). Sphere also receives 
criticism for being so general that it is difficult to 
adapt to a particular context (O’Donnell, 2002). Sphere has 
also come under scrutiny for representing the ideas and 
priorities of developed-world professionals, thus leaving 
little or belated opportunity for beneficiaries to lend a 
voice (Dufour, 2004).  
1.2.1.3 ALNAP  
 
 The Active Learning Network for Accountability and 
Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) is, like Sphere, 
an inter-agency collaborative effort.  In addition to 
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attempting to facilitate learning and improved 
accountability, ALNAP serves as a repository for evaluative 
reports of the relief efforts of various groups.  These are 
intended as a resource for further learning.  It publishes 
an annual Review of Humanitarian Action in which it 
compiles evaluation learning from member agencies.  It also 
provides them with its “proforma,” an evaluation guide.   
ALNAP is particularly focused on sharing of knowledge 
between organizations.  It emphasizes improved quality as a 
continual goal(Hilhorst, 2002). Better quality of 
information exchange will lead to better tools for future 
decision-making. 
1.2.1.4 People-In-Aid 
People-In-Aid is a human resources-oriented project 
that maintains its Code of Good Practice.  The Code names 
seven main principles and accompanying indicators and 
focuses on a context-rich social audit approach.  It is 
engineered as a tool for human resources management, but 
professes to be adaptable to other audiences.   It is not 
designed to be an instrument for measuring the success of a 
program; it is simply a guideline for practice. 
1.2.1.5 Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 
International 
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The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership – 
International (HAP), established in 2003, is a regulatory 
entity for international humanitarian assistance efforts.  
Its ultimate mission is to respect the rights of the 
intended beneficiaries of humanitarian aid through holding 
aid agencies accountable to those beneficiaries.   
Consultation and research on the part of HAP has led to its 
development of seven core principles of accountability.  
Members of HAP commit to striving to uphold these 
principles in theory and in practice through self and 
external regulation.   
In accordance with its seven core principles of 
accountability, HAP has developed accountability standards 
against which its members can measure their own 
accountability practice and identify their strengths and 
gaps.  The accountability and quality management standards 
are not meant to duplicate the HAP core principles; rather, 
they provide an instrument for verifying whether a given 
agency upholds a minimum level of accountability to its 
beneficiaries.  HAP has an eventual goal of creating a 
certification system through which humanitarian aid 
agencies can seek officially to be named as being in 
compliance with the core principles of accountability.  
This is HAP’s main distinction from Sphere, the Code of 
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Conduct, and People-In-Aid: it endeavors to be measurable 
and to measure. 
Both practitioners and academic researchers use these 
sets of codes and standards not only for planning relief 
efforts, but for evaluating them.  Some commonly cited 
strengths of these resources include inter-agency 
collaboration and a rights-based approach.  The weakness 
most often mentioned is the difficulty of complex 
situational/contextual dimensions to which these fairly 
generalized standards do not adapt well.  Also, the 
complexity of arranging for beneficiary participation in 
these relief efforts is an oft-cited challenge for these 
standards. Both Sphere and ALNAP are committed to a 
minimum level of transparency and accountability in the 
humanitarian assistance community.  Evaluations have the 
potential to be a tool for promoting accountability and for 
learning within an organization.  How to assess an 
evaluation’s impact in terms of promoting organizational 
learning is a difficult question given the variety of types 
of evaluations and the range of quality within evaluations.   
Though theory-driven articles on evaluation use, 
utilization, and influence abound, there are few accessible 
examples of tracking that influence within organizations.  
In part, this has to do with the difficulty in defining 
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what constitutes influence within a given organization and 
where that influence might surface.  Aside from direct, 
instrumental use of evaluation findings, instances of 
evaluation influence are hard to extricate from other 
influences in organizational operating procedures and 
policy decisions.  Furthermore, evaluation influence is new 
and complex enough that few structures exist as starting 
points for an organization wishing to assess the nature and 
extent of evaluation influence within its practice. 
INGOs have faced mounting pressure from funders and 
from governments to assure their transparency in their 
appropriate use of funds to conduct humanitarian work.  
Indeed, compliance and oversight is a main purpose of 
evaluation: Mark, Henry, and Julnes (2000)list the 
assessment of how an organization meets rules and 
expectations among their four purposes for evaluation. 
Chelimsky (1997)discusses the “accountability perspective” 
as one of three core perspectives an evaluator takes in 
approaching an evaluation.  Accountability, then, is a 
central function of evaluation.   
It is one thing for organizations to confirm that they 
comply with the expectations of major donors by conducting 
an evaluation whose findings point to appropriate use of 
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donated funds.  This is certainly a critical role for 
evaluations of humanitarian relief efforts.  But if 
evaluation also influences humanitarian aid organizations 
in other ways, particularly in serving the purpose of 
program and policy improvement (Mark et al., 2000), the 
humble evaluation has the potential to play a central role 
in helping humanitarian assistance INGOs to fulfill their 
missions of improving, and even saving, lives.  The main 
research problem addressed here is: evaluation findings may 
serve a purpose beyond accountability in humanitarian 
assistance organization, specifically one of project, 
program, and policy improvement.  A dearth of recorded 
examples exists of how and whether evaluations influence 
humanitarian relief organizations, to say nothing of the 
ingredients for a successful instance of influence.  This 
research problem points to two main research questions. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
A. Do evaluations of INGOs’ disaster relief activities 
go beyond accountability to affect INGOs’ practice? 
Though program oversight is a primary reason for initiating 
an evaluation, a report that actually improves on service 
delivery is valuable in a sector whose mission has to do 
with bettering lives.  
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B. If evaluations of disaster relief activities do 
improve subsequent projects, what elements of the 
evaluation process or report contribute to the 
evaluation’s influence on programs and policies? 
If indeed such evaluations do have an impact on the 
decision-making around policies and programs, an 
organization would benefit from understanding the factors 
that contribute to the evaluation’s being employed 
positively.  Those factors may be intentional or 
unintentional. 
1.4 THE CASE OF CARE 
 To address these two questions, this study considers 
the case of CARE, whose emergency response work is well-
recognized.  CARE’s humanitarian assistance work is a 
compelling single-case study because it is both 
representative of typical INGO work in this area, and 
unique in its particular structure and dynamic.  Virtually 
all of the evaluations considered in this study were of 
responses to emergencies to which other prominent INGOs 
also responded.  By analyzing the case of CARE, this 
research purports to offer a window on the evaluation 
characteristics and dynamics typical of INGOs with a 
similar degree of reach and exposure. 
19 
 
 CARE got its start in the 1940s directly after the 
second World War, when it formed to offer succor to war 
survivors.  Though the organization’s work today is not 
limited to humanitarian relief, its main mission is to 
fight poverty, in part through emergency response.  Whether 
the emergency is a natural disaster or a conflict, CARE 
participates in several types of projects, including 
temporary shelter construction, food and water provision, 
medical care, and rehabilitation strategies such as 
economic development.  CARE’s name is so well-recognized 
that it received a staggering amount of donations following 
the Asia tsunami of 2004.  Because of this name 
recognition, it is particularly critical that CARE hold 
itself accountable to itself, its donors, and its 
beneficiaries.  Because the organization dabbles in so many 
areas of relief and development, including education, 
HIV/AIDS, economic development and water/sanitation, its 
ability to follow up on evaluation findings to improve 
programming can distinguish it as a premier organization in 
the world of emergency response. 
CARE, as one of the eight largest and farthest-
reaching agencies involved in humanitarian assistance 
(Cooley & Ron, 2002), has been a major recipient of the 
increased flow of funding to disaster relief efforts, both 
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from USAID and from private individuals and foundations.  
As a signatory of the Red Cross Code of Conduct and as an 
active member of Sphere, ALNAP, and HAP, CARE is a forcible 
presence in the multitude of initiatives to harness 
humanitarian aid organization accountability.   CARE’s 
current emergency response efforts extend from supplying 
food and water to providing shelter to facilitation of 
health care provision and delivery of essential supplies.   
 Though CARE has periodically conducted in-depth 
evaluations of its emergency response activities, only in 
recent years has the organization made a concerted effort 
to evaluate every emergency response project with an eye 
toward transparency through making evaluation reports 
widely available.  Availability is not limited to internal 
CARE staff; large evaluations are also available to other 
NGOs and agencies involved in relief work.  This commitment 
to transparency reflects an international focus on 
coordinating and improving on current emergency response 
practices.  The choice of CARE as a study subject precludes 
an overly general conclusion as to evaluation influence in 
nonprofit organizations. An international INGO with 
multiple large funding sources is part of a small group of 
contextually distinct nonprofits for whom milieu is so 
integral to their operations that their accountability 
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practices do not mimic those of smaller-scope nonprofits 
with fewer funding resources(Ebrahim, 2005). 
 Within CARE, organizational decision-making happens 
within several tiers.  CARE itself is a confederation of 11 
member groups, and so its decision-making is not strictly 
hierarchical.  Policy decision-making occurs at the 
executive level.  An executive group meets (twice per year) 
to examine priorities for the coming year.  This group also 
does strategic planning for the organization on a five-year 
basis.  For program-level decision making, biannual 
meetings of program directors and officers result in an 
agenda for the coming fiscal year.  The same is true on a 
country-by-country level.  Moreover, a disaster invites ad-
hoc planning of the sort necessary for dealing with an 
unforeseen situation.  Many planning and decision-making 
events occur in this manner as well.   Because of its 
confederation structure, CARE will not be a case study 
directly applicable to all agencies its size; nevertheless, 
its evaluation systems and challenges will be relevant to 
organizations engaged in similar work. 
 CARE International’s emergency response evaluations 
will serve as the case study for these research questions. 
An ODI report (Willits-King & Darcy, 2005)on agencies that 
respond to complex emergencies found that CARE has a much-
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deserved reputation among beneficiaries for responding 
effectively to emergencies, but that the organization 
invests little in emergency response by comparison to its 
peers.  The report suggested that CARE is recognized for 
the quality of its work in humanitarian relief, but that 
the organization could commit more resources and better 
utilize existing resources to scale up and increase its 
capacity to respond.   
 The nonhierarchical structure and the multinational 
scope of CARE’s work present particular challenges for 
evaluation.  It is difficult to limit any evaluation in the 
organization to one single unit of analysis because the 
information needs of different bodies in the organization 
are very different.  It can be difficult, as well, to 
gather consistent data in such an organization because of 
logistics and language and cultural obstacles.  Also, there 
are multiple relationship dynamics that come into play when 
considering the areas of influence on which evaluations 
touch.  For these reasons, CARE is an intriguing case study 
whose patterns of influence have implications for how 
similar complex transnational organizations function. 
 The study draws from two main data sources. The first 
of these data sources is all of the available evaluation 
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reports from CARE’s emergency response activity from 2000-
2005.  These reports range from a brief summary to a multi-
document behemoth.  CARE uses four main formats for 
evaluation of emergency response efforts. 1) The Real Time 
Evaluation occurs in the middle of an intervention and 
assesses the success of the effort so far. 2) The After 
Action Review occurs just after an intervention and is 
typically a reflection session lasting three or four days 
and involving the staff members, temporary and permanent, 
who comprised the emergency response team.  The 3) Final 
Evaluation occurs after the intervention and formally 
formulates the lessons CARE hopes to take away from the 
experience of the response for the future.  4) The Multi 
Agency Evaluation involves the major INGOs who collaborated 
to mount a response in a large-scale emergency.  These 
evaluation assess not only the effectiveness of each 
respective INGO, but examine the collaboration and 
coordination among all of the INGOs.   
 The second source of data is a series of interviews 
with 25 different people associated with the evaluation 
process, from evaluators to field workers to management 
team executives.  These individuals offer insight into 
their own perceptions and experience of whether and how the 
evaluations influence CARE and their practice.  The 
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interviews examine both the perspectives of those who 
conduct the evaluations and the perceptions of those who 
purportedly read and use the final evaluation reports. 
 The research draws upon Kirkhart’s (2000)Integrated 
Theory of Influence, which considers evaluations using 
three different gauges: Intention (intended or unintended), 
Source (process or results), and Time (immediate, end-of-
cycle, or long-term).  These dimensions inform the 
interview questions around whether and how the evaluations 
from 2000-2005 affected later practice and policy. 
 The central analysis for the evaluation and interview 
data employs Henry and Mark’s (2003)’pathways’ of 
evaluation influence as the basis for examining how an 
evaluation affects an INGO from start to finish.  Like 
Kirkhart, Henry and Mark find ‘use’ to be a limiting term, 
and they advocate for the broader ‘influence.’  Their work 
culls from social science theories to propose pathways of 
influence which help to categorize the different levels at 
which influence might occur: 1) the individual, 2) the 
interpersonal, or 3) the collective.   
Henry and Mark’s taxonomy offers a starting point for 
examining one organization’s treatment of evaluations in 
the emergency response arena.  The analysis will use these 
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three levels of influence to track interview responses and 
evaluation report data in order to observe how the report 
process and findings influence various levels of 
communication, if at all.   
Their taxonomy proposes a sort of menu for identifying 
and categorizing examples of influence.  They are drawing 
from multiple disciplines, so some of their influence 
categories are more likely to show up in a large, 
decentralized INGO such as CARE than are others.  For 
example, in the “individual” level of influence, the 
“attitude change” mechanism is likely to surface in a study 
of CARE because it is a mechanism that easily lends itself 
to a program (as opposed to a policy).  Determining whether 
an individual’s attitude shifted is entirely feasible with 
interview data.  Conversely, the “salience” mechanism is 
more about policy-related issues than about programs, and 
so is not as likely to emerge from the CARE study.  Other 
mechanisms, such as “elaboration,” are difficult to 
pinpoint with interview data.  Finally, it is more likely 
that the study will reveal examples of the individual-level 
mechanisms and the interpersonal-level mechanisms than the 
collective-level mechanisms.  This is because it is easier 
and takes less time to effect change at a programmatic 
level than at a policy level. Moreover, one of the five 
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pre-interviewees for the study mentioned his own impression 
that evaluation reports stop short of having policy-level 
influence at CARE, in part because the culture of learning 
there does not leave room for evaluation data in executive 
team agendas.   
1.5 DEFINITION OF TERMS 
The following terms will be useful for understanding 
this study: 
INGO – international non-governmental organization.  For 
the purposes of this study, the acronym ‘INGO’ describes 
any internationally-operating not-for-profit organization 
or agency.   
Humanitarian aid – this work is distinct from development 
work and the term refers to outside assistance for 
communities suffering from urgent crises such as natural 
disasters, conflicts, droughts, or famines. 
Use and utilization – these terms will refer to the 
employment of evaluation findings in decision-making.  The 
review of the literature and the discussion of methodology 
will further detail these and will also distinguish between 
evaluation use and evaluation influence. 
Lessons learned – though this term seems at times 
synonymous with ‘recommendations’ in CARE’s evaluation 
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reports, for the purposes of this paper it will refer to 
those items identified through an evaluation that point to 
room for improvement and that bear consideration in 
planning for future emergencies.  
1.6 DELIMITATIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
 
This study looks specifically at CARE International’s 
use of evaluation reports for its emergency response 
projects. CARE, as one of the largest NGOs working in 
emergency relief, is a good case for the assessment of how 
evaluations influence the organization at different levels. 
This study was limited by the geographic location of 
the researcher.  Though CARE is a confederation whose 
secretariat is based in Geneva, Switzerland, CARE USA, 
based in Atlanta, GA, typically plays a somewhat larger 
role than the other CARE countries in responding to 
humanitarian crises.  This, combined with the fact that the 
researcher is based near Atlanta, GA, means that the study 
contains a disproportionate number of Atlanta-based 
interviews.  In addition, the design of the study, while 
in-depth enough to provide a good picture of evaluation 
implementation within the humanitarian aid section of CARE, 
is not broad enough to treat any other INGO with such 
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depth.  The study sacrifices generalize-ability in the 
interest of internal validity in treating the case of CARE.   
The study will have relevance for all humanitarian aid 
agencies working on an international level, but will be 
limited to an in-depth study of CARE International’s 
emergency response evaluations from 2000-2005.  The two-
part study includes a meta-evaluation of all evaluation 
reports conducted within or on behalf of CARE for its 
humanitarian aid activities from 2000-2005.  This meta-
evaluation will be coupled with interviews with 25 CARE 
employees and consultants who are involved in the 
evaluations whether as evaluators, as field workers, as 
senior management, or as middle management.    
1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
Existing research treats the subject of evaluation 
utilization thoroughly. Though much has been written 
theoretically about evaluation use, utilization, and 
influence, few empirical studies have attempted to track 
evaluation report findings from completion to utilization.  
Fewer still have looked at evaluation implementation as it 
pertains to humanitarian aid agencies.  In the interest of 
responding to the recent calls for greater accountability 
on the part of humanitarian aid agencies, this study aims 
to address the gap in the literature pertaining to their 
29 
 
implementation of evaluation findings.  Improved practice 
is one of the important goals of evaluation, and improved 
practice in emergency response can save lives.   
1.8 RESEARCHER’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
As a former Peace Corps volunteer, the researcher has 
the tendency to suspect that INGOs, especially those of 
CARE’s reach and magnitude, are inefficient, bureaucratic, 
and, at times, too “corporate.”  Though she was careful to 
try to lay aside any such biases in conducting interviews, 
she risks unwittingly coloring her conclusions with 
preconceived images.  The researcher worked with CARE as an 
intern prior to conducting the research for this project, 
and as such considers her relationships there to be 
friendly rather than impartial. She made an effort to have 
other eyes look at the research material when she thought 
there was the possibility of missing something due to her 
being sympathetic to CARE. 
1.9 KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
 
 A major challenge for this study is isolating 
different forms of influence for evaluations.  Determining 
whether or not field offices have followed up on 
operational recommendations, a direct, instrumental form of 
influence, is straightforward; discerning whether an 
evaluation affected the social fabric of the organization 
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is not.  That is to say that it is one thing to identify 
instances of change, but another to be able to attribute 
that change to the evaluation process or findings.  
Nevertheless, the exercise of identifying mechanisms of 
influence is valuable because it illuminates the possible 
forms that the evaluation influence might take, thus 
allowing for taking steps toward developing a theory for 
how evaluations work in the humanitarian aid agency 
setting. 
 The study assumes that the designated interviewees are 
indeed an adequately representative cross-section of those 
who would learn directly or indirectly from an evaluation 
in the organization.  It is possible that a category of 
people has been left out, or that the interviews are heavy 
in one area of representation and light in another.  One 
way of curbing this has been having the design, monitoring 
and evaluation coordinator for CARE look over the list of 
interviewees for balance and representation.  Another has 
been to ask the interviewees themselves whom they would 
suggest talking to, and checking those contributions 
against the list of interviewees.  
 Building theory about organizational learning is 
beyond the scope of this research; the overarching goal is 
to provide CARE with insights on how to make its evaluation 
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process more effective for learning and to contribute to 
the dialogue on how evaluation influence works.  It is 
likely that the results will not generalize easily to other 
aid organizations.  Dissemination of the findings of this 
research to CARE will be of particular importance, as 
adding another long report to CARE employees’ reading lists 
would hardly send the right message about evaluation report 
efficiency and effectiveness.   
 Evaluation has the potential to help an organization 
fulfill its mission by complementing its quest for higher 
quality and greater knowledge.  The challenge becomes 
determining whether the good intentions for the evaluation 
report’s end use come to fruition.  Exploring how 
evaluation eventually influences an organization is a 
practical step for an organization whose success in 
responding to a crisis depends partly on its self-
understanding of its strengths and resources.  If a better 
comprehension of how evaluation influences the organization 
and beyond can lead to designing evaluations that have 
greater influence, personnel whose mission is to mitigate 
poverty, to alleviate suffering, will be better equipped to 
do so. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 The following review of the literature lays out the 
case for the importance and relevance of looking at how 
evaluation influence works in a transnational organization.  
Beginning with the literature on accountability, the 
chapter looks at how accountability relates to evaluation 
and why heightened calls for better accountability 
necessitate more utile evaluations.  A review of how the 
literature on evaluation use has evolved into a dialogue 
about the many nuances of evaluation influence exposes the 
need for more empirical study of how influence works.  The 
review then presents the two theoretical models that inform 
this study. Finally, a look at the literature on learning 
organizations provides a point of departure for discussion 
and reflection on the relationship between the 
organization’s learning culture and the influence of 
evaluations within it. 
 The search for literature related to the question of 
how evaluation reports are used or under-used in 
humanitarian aid organizations revealed an impressive range 
of different kinds of evaluation activities in the INGO 
world as well as a spate of literature on the utilization 
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of evaluation.  In addition to Google Scholar, the 
researcher searched the following databases for relevant 
literature: ABI/Inform, Academic Search Premier, Jstor, 
PAIS, and the Web of Science.  She employed the following 
terms for the search: evaluation use, evaluation 
utilization, evaluation influence, evaluation and 
accountability, humanitarian aid and accountability, 
humanitarian aid and evaluation, evaluation and 
organizational learning, INGO and learning organization.  
Her intent with these last two search terms was to 
ascertain whether others have studied or written about 
accountability or utilization as part of or as resulting 
from a culture of learning within an organization. 
2.1 Accountability versus Evaluation 
 
The terms ‘accountability’ and ‘evaluation’ are often 
used interchangeably in disaster relief parlance.  There 
is, however, an important distinction between the two.  
Evaluation purports to add to or improve an organization’s 
accountability.  This makes accountability an important 
piece of the discussion on the influence of evaluation in 
humanitarian relief, as recent years have seen increased 
attention to the importance of accountability in such 
agencies as media and public scrutiny of them rises. 
Accountability usually refers to documenting how donor 
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funds were spent or, in the case of government dollars, 
being accountable to taxpayers for the use of their tax 
money.  Accountability is larger than budget records and is 
also a statement of who is responsible for what or who is 
in control (I. Smillie, and Larry Minear, 2004).   
Evaluation, on the other hand, subsumes 
accountability; in fact, the best-known set of standards 
for program evaluation in the United States is that of the 
Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation 
(The Program Evaluation Standards, 1994).  These standards 
aim to guide process and outcome evaluations of programs.  
The standards fall under four headings: utility, 
feasibility, propriety, and accuracy.  Accountability falls 
in the propriety category.  Mark, Henry, and Julnes (2000) 
list accountability (their term is ‘compliance and 
oversight’ as one of four main purposes of evaluation.  
This is germane to this study because if evaluations are 
likely to be initiated within the INGO because of increased 
concern for greater accountability, the question arises as 
to whether they can also be used to greater effect in other 
ways. Ebrahim (2003a)distinguishes between internal and 
external accountability within NGOs. External 
accountability refers to how the INGO answers to donors. 
Internal accountability is the agency’s responsibility to 
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itself to perform well.  Alistair Hallam (1998)insists that 
evaluations of complex emergencies should stress either 
accountability or lesson-learning, and if they stress 
lesson-learning, they ought to be participatory.  Donahue 
and Tuohy (2007)contend that in disaster response, 
“lessons-learned” is a ‘misnomer.’  Their exploratory study 
concludes that, in fact, lessons are too often not learned.  
Donahue and Tuohy, through a series of focus group 
interviews, found that even if lessons are identified, an 
organization often has few systems in place for 
institutionalizing the learning.  
 Kirkby et al. list accountability, knowledge, and 
development as three perspectives on disaster evaluation 
(Kirkby, Howorth, Keefe, & Collins, 2001).  They emphasize 
that evaluations have purpose, notably knowledge increase, 
beyond accounting to donors.  They mention the value of 
inter-agency evaluation for enhanced learning; the Joint 
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, they observe, 
has become a benchmark of sorts for this kind of inter-
organizational learning.  Smillie (1997), in discussing 
accountability within an examination on what it means for 
an INGO to be ‘transparent,’ asks, “greater than what?” as 
in, NGOs are always called to greater transparency. But 
greater than what? The accountability question is the same: 
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NGOs are called to be more accountable. But more 
accountable than whom?  Organizations such as HAP are 
answering that question with a set of standards for NGOs to 
use as a reference point.  It is clear that there is 
attention in the literature to establishing a minimum 
standard of accountability. This begs the question of 
whether there is a limit to how much effort an organization 
should put into striving for greater accountability.  There 
is a question of whether there a point at which the costs 
of evaluating exceed the benefits to the organization of 
the evaluation outcomes. Of course, it seems lofty and 
ideal for an organization to strive for ever-greater 
transparency and accountability. But nonprofits by 
definition are working with limited resources, and at some 
point spending resources on accountability practices takes 
resources away from the programs themselves.   
2.2 Utility of evaluation 
 
 Though accountability receives a great deal of 
attention as a main purpose of post-crisis evaluation, 
utility of the evaluation is of particular importance for 
assessing response to conflict or disaster situations.  
There are a number of different ‘uses’ identified 
throughout the literature, from a distinction between 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ use (Scriven, 1991),to a 
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categorization of use as conceptual; symbolic; 
enlightenment; imposed (Weiss, Murphy-Graham, & Birkeland, 
2005).‘Intended use’ of an evaluation is always a 
significant consideration, but in an emergency, planning 
for response can be ad-hoc in nature and can tend to draw 
from available, rather than optimal, resources.  
Consequently, organizational processing of positive and 
negative lessons learned from disaster response can be of 
particular value for anticipating and preparing for future 
crises.  This research will employ Karen Kirkhart’s (2000) 
“re-conceptualized” theory of use to examine the 
characteristics of emergency response evaluations along 
axes of source, intent, and time, as a step toward 
understanding the evaluation report contents and where 
those report contents might hold influence. That report 
data informs the coding of the interview data, for which 
Henry and Mark’s (2003) framework provides the basis. 
Current thinking on evaluation use stems from a body 
of work on knowledge and research utilization that sprang 
from a governmental focus on social betterment in the 1960s 
and 1970s.  Lyndon B Johnson’s War on Poverty brought with 
it an increased spending, not just on social programs, but 
also on social science research to inform the poverty 
battle.  With the onslaught of social science research came 
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a heightened concern for accountability, and it is out of 
this period that program evaluation became an established 
area of practice.  Technology transfer, also, emerged as a 
critical research area, with obvious implications for how 
the research was disseminated.    
 That research theoretically results in new knowledge 
was not a novel concept during this period of establishing 
program evaluation; of greater concern was how 
practitioners utilized that knowledge.  Social science 
research provided a means of identifying cause-and-effect 
relationships between programming and results, which was of 
keen interest to decision-makers (Weiss, 1977). 
Nevertheless, the factors contributing to effective 
utilization of research remained to be identified.  Much of 
the scholarly thinking during this period looked at the use 
of research on a national or policy level; the 
organizational level was still to come.  This attention to 
accountability did not extend to NGOs during this time.  
NGOs received relatively little public and private funding 
(and thus little pressure to measure the impact they were 
having) until the 1980s (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).  The 1990s 
brought still another increase in funding, and a tandem 
focus on accountability. 
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 The 1980s saw a shift in scholarship toward attempting 
deliberately to predict or to influence evaluation use.  
The need to distinguish between different kinds of use 
became apparent.  Carol Weiss (1977) introduced 
instrumental use as a term for the classic linear form of 
use, or the use, perhaps, that the researcher intended: the 
researcher or evaluator proffers knowledge directly to the 
user, who in turn uses it immediately and as the researcher 
envisioned.  Conceptual use, for Weiss, is less direct and 
occurs when a piece of knowledge influences an individual’s 
thinking about a policy or program.  Finally, symbolic use 
occurs when decision-makers use research knowledge for 
political gain or to justify already-made decisions.   
Though scholars were distinguishing between different kinds 
of use at this point, many programs -- including INGO 
development and relief programs -- were not.  ALNAP, formed 
in 1997, raised the dialogue about evaluation use in the 
humanitarian assistance world by providing a forum for 
“lessons learned” jointly and individually.  Only in its 
most recent (Sandison, 2006)research is ALNAP including 
different kinds of use in its scope.   
 In the late 1980s, a large contribution to the 
thinking on evaluation use came in the form of the Weiss-
Patton debate (M. Q. Patton, 1988; Shulha & Cousins, 1997; 
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Smith, 1989; Weiss, 1988; Weiss, 1998). Weiss, as a keynote 
speaker at the annual meeting of the American Evaluation 
Association in Boston in 1987, made remarks concerning the 
role of evaluators in determining the ultimate use of 
evaluation research.  She contended that the information 
resulting from evaluations is not the only factor that 
influences decision-making; there are political, even non-
rational, characteristics of decision-making contexts that 
affect how evaluation information is received.  Evaluators, 
then, should focus on good evaluation design and good data.  
Patton took Weiss to task for this, asserting the primary 
responsibility of evaluators to those who will ultimately 
use the evaluation results.  His concept of use starts with 
the evaluator journeying with the stakeholders and helping 
them identify what they need from the evaluation.  The 
evaluation report, then, will be useful if it provides 
information that meets those needs.  Smith (Smith, 
1989)pointed out that both Weiss and Patton contribute 
important ideas to the concept of use, but that the program 
context is critical to determining who the stakeholders are 
and how they can or will use evaluation information.  
Weiss, in addressing the American Evaluation Association 
again a decade later (Weiss, 1998), acknowledged that she 
and Patton, in fact, agreed on a number of points, 
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particularly at the program level.  She went on to discuss 
emerging understandings of what it is that is used.  She 
asserted that use is no longer just about evaluation 
findings, but extends to influence on other organizations 
and institutions.  This debate paralleled attempts at joint 
evaluations on the part of humanitarian relief agencies 
responding to disasters.  Multilateral donors, NGOs, and 
consultants comprised the team of evaluators for a large-
scale joint evaluation of the response to the Rwanda 
genocide in 1994(Wood, 2001).  This well-publicized effort 
showed the importance of context to program effectiveness 
and revealed the importance of considering the effects of 
the evaluation findings on multiple agencies and 
institutions.  It is not uncommon to explain the 
inefficiency in using evaluation findings on the political 
nature of large organizations (Frerks & Hilhorst, 2002).  
In more recent research dialogue, the concept of 
“process use” has introduced the idea that the very process 
of evaluating is itself a form of use: an interview can be 
a type of intervention, data gathering can increase inter-
organizational communication, and the evaluator’s 
interaction with stakeholders can provide them with an 
opportunity for reflection (Shulha & Cousins, 1997).  The 
idea of process use expanded beyond the individual’s use to 
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include organizational learning.  Patton’s (2002)appealing 
“intended use by intended users” hearkens to the notion 
that on some level, use ought to be deliberate.  His 
philosophy that end users who are invested in the 
evaluation process itself will use the resulting 
information fruitfully makes the important point that 
programs are fundamentally made up of human beings, and 
their involvement has to matter.  For some kinds of 
evaluation, such as empowerment evaluation, the people are 
the only thing that matter in terms of use, as long as they 
emerge from the evaluation with the capacity to evaluate 
themselves (Fetterman 2001).   
Patton’s ‘utilization-focused’ evaluation is optimal 
for ensuring impact on some level.  It does not address 
unintended impact or so called “symbolic use” (Beyer & 
Trice, 1982).  This is not a shortcoming; it is simply to 
say that Patton’s approach is not necessarily the ideal 
model for all evaluation occasions.  He does intimate that 
‘process use’ can facilitate communication (Shulha & 
Cousins, 1997), a notion echoed by Shulock(2000), who 
mentions it as a means of ‘framing political discourse.’  
Patton’s stance, however, is relevant to some contexts, and 
not to others; when an evaluation is outcome-oriented, for 
example, is large-scale, and is not concerned with process 
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questions, the ‘intended users’ become hard to work with 
very personally. 
Shulock’s concept of use, adding to the language in 
order to further facilitate discussion of new or revisited 
knowledge, highlights the importance of reporting results 
with an eye toward framing future decision-making dialogue.  
Her argument is further reinforced with her empirical test 
of her ideas; empirical testing of use is not commonplace 
and has much potential for demonstrating how one might 
integrate good theory of use into practice. 
The study of evaluation use in an organizational 
setting led to greater questions about organizational 
learning and knowledge management.   Evaluation utilization 
relates to the organizational learning environment.  This 
is particularly true if, as Patton (1994) suggests, the 
process of evaluating is the learning environment.  This 
idea of process as a valuable forum independent of a 
“findings” report is only very recently visible in the 
humanitarian aid world.  There is an emerging distinction – 
most identifiable in ALNAP’s evaluative reports database -- 
between mid-crisis evaluations, final syntheses, and post-
response reviews, which are more about reflection on the 
part of the response team than about impact measurement.   
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Conner (1998) posits that in order to progress in our 
thinking about evaluation use, we must take a different, 
more macroscopic view; Kirkhart(2000)asserts that language 
is important when theorizing about evaluation, and that 
“use” is not a sufficiently precise term for describing the 
way that organizations employ evaluation findings. She 
suggests the more expansive “influence,” which she contends 
more accurately captures “…effects that are 
multidirectional, incremental, un-intentional, and non-
instrumental, alongside those that are unidirectional, 
episodic, intended, and instrumental.”  Her Integrated 
Theory of Influence considers evaluations using three 
different gauges: Intention (intended or unintended, Source 
(process or results), and Time (immediate, end-of-cycle, or 
long-term.  
The first of her dimensions, source of influence, 
refers to the point at which -- or as a result of which -- 
the evaluation effects change. This may be at the process 
level or at the results level. The process level comes from 
Patton’s (1998)(1998) notion of “process use,” that is, use 
that stems from the exercise of evaluating. The idea is 
that involvement in the steps of evaluating can affect an 
individual or organization in ways distinct from how the 
ultimate findings of the evaluation might.  For the 
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purposes of this study, the logic model for CARE’s 
emergency response evaluations includes both the process 
and the results categories for source of influence: indeed, 
one format of evaluation in particular (the After Action 
Review) for CARE lends itself to a “process” source of 
influence. 
Kirkhart’s second dimension in her theory of influence 
is intention. Intention in her model is a description of 
whether and how the result of an evaluation is targeted or 
purposeful.  She distinguishes between manifest intended 
influence and latent intended influence, that is, 
articulated influence such as program improvement, and 
unstated intention such as building a program’s 
credibility. “Unintended” influence is simply that which 
those conducting or commissioning the evaluation did not 
anticipate. 
The third element of Kirkhart’s framework is time, 
which she categorizes as immediate, end-of-cycle, or long-
term. Acknowledging that these are arbitrary categories, 
she nevertheless points out that just as programs evolve at 
different points in their life cycle, so does the potential 
influence of evaluation results on the program. Her “time” 
dimension also considers whether an instance of influence 
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occurs at a single moment in time as opposed to a change 
process woven through the time period. 
Kirkhart’s thinking on evaluation influence marked an 
acknowledgement in the literature that ‘use’ and 
‘utilization’ are problematic terms for capturing the 
entirety of the panoply of possible consequences of 
evaluation results. Henry and Mark(2003)also prefer the 
broader ‘influence,’ and offer a framework for representing 
how evaluation effects various sorts of changes and 
ultimately leads to ‘social betterment.’  Their distinction 
of levels of influence as being between intra- and inter-
personal change processes brings up a consideration absent 
from Kirkhart’s three dimensions of source, intention, and 
time: influence can occur at the level of the individual or 
at the level of more than one interacting individual. Henry 
and Mark centrally argue that any evaluation has 
anticipated outcomes and that mapping influence through the 
individual, interpersonal, and collective levels can trace 
change all the way from the evaluation to the policy level.  
Henry and Mark’s taxonomy, drawing from several bodies 
of literature in social science disciplines, categorizes 
evaluation influence into three levels, each of which has 
several change processes representing what evaluation 
influence could look like in any given context.  Their 
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levels of influence offer a sort of “menu” from which the 
evaluator or the researcher may select in order to cater a 
theory of influence to a particular situation.  This figure 
depicts how their levels of influence break down into 
levels and “menu” items1: 
 
Figure 1: Mechanisms Through Which Evaluation Produces 
Influences 
 
The individual level concerns change brought about in 
a single person as a result of participating in an 
evaluation or reading the findings in an evaluation report.  
The types of influence for the individual level range from 
                                                   
1 From Henry, G.T., and Mark, M.M. (2003).  Beyond Use: 
Understanding  Evaluation’s Influence on Attitudes and 
Actions. Sage: American Journal of Evaluation 24. 
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attitude change about an issue or program to actual 
behavioral change.  The interpersonal level addresses types 
of influence occurring between two or more persons, as when 
one person uses an evaluation’s findings to persuade 
another of his position.  The collective level looks at 
change brought about at the organizational or inter-
organizational level, as when an evaluation’s findings 
diffuse to another setting and foster change there.   
Henry and Mark’s framework proposes a potentially 
useful tool for categorizing forms of evaluation influence, 
for tracing “pathways” of influence, and eventually for 
designing evaluations to have greater positive influence. 
Very few studies have applied the Henry and Mark framework 
to a particular case; Weiss et al. (2005) found that Henry 
and Mark’s (2003) framework fit their data well. The 
results of their study of the effectiveness of the 
evaluations of the D.A.R.E. program corroborate Henry and 
Mark’s (2003; Mark & Henry, 2004) three change process 
levels. Their study is particularly interesting because 
they looked at evaluations of a program widely and publicly 
considered to be a failure. It would be easy to argue that 
the evaluations of DARE were irrelevant given the 
prevailing attitude about the merit of the program. 
However, Weiss et al.’s application of the Henry and Mark 
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framework finds that the framework fits the DARE evaluation 
experience. That the Henry and Mark general framework 
adapts to fit a local context suggests that evaluation 
influence is, in itself, a viable concept, and that 
evaluation itself can cause change in even cause multi-
level positive change even in a failed program.  The 
authors also identify a new concept of use – imposed use – 
where (federal) donors may dictate what an agency does with 
its evaluation results in order to continue to be funded.  
This may be relevant to the case at hand; Weiss et al. 
speculate that a ‘results’ orientation will foster imposed 
use, and CARE professes itself to be results-oriented.  
  Kirkhart and Mark and Henry make good cases for the 
potential applications of a sound theory of influence 
adaptable to a given context. Both offer dimensions 
(Kirkhart’s term) that might undergird such a model of 
influence. Other possibilities for dimensions show up in 
the literature. Almeida and Báscolo (2006), in their review 
of the literature on use of research results in decision-
making, present the interaction between the researchers and 
the decision-makers as a potential root of knowledge 
transfer. This could be a subset of Kirkhart’s source of 
influence dimension.  Leviton (2003)finds both the Kirkhart 
model and the Mark and Henry framework to be practitioner-
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friendly distillations of theoretical advances on the topic 
of evaluation use, though she suggests that there is even 
still a need to consider context and user knowledge 
construction.  Leviton’s supposition is particularly 
relevant to the CARE example because there are several 
different learning and operating contexts within the same 
organization, all of which draw from the same evaluation 
reports.    
 Ginsberg and Rhett(2003)look at a series of education 
evaluations in an attempt to pinpoint where evaluations 
have influenced legislation and policymaking. Though the 
thrust of their work is to make a case for scientifically 
rigorous methodology in response to increasing call for 
good evidence in the policy arena, they also convincingly 
observe that not all good questions are causal and that 
sound methodology can address implementation, not just 
cause.  Their work is an important example of how 
evaluation influence at a policy level can be traced back 
to the evaluation itself.  A large organization could, 
perhaps, trace evaluation influence to determine whether 
the evaluation reports have any influence on organizational 
policy. 
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2.3 LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Examining the influence of evaluation on a large 
humanitarian relief agency would not be complete without 
considering the organization’s internal culture of 
learning.  The employees’ perception of the culture of 
learning also surely has an effect on their attitude toward 
the utility of evaluation.  The body of literature on 
organizational learning is vast and spans decades.  Argyris 
and Schon’s seminal work on organizational learning 
(Argyris & Schon, 1978; 1996)fleshes out the seeming 
paradox embedded in the concept: individual people learn, 
retain information, transfer information, and so forth, so 
how can an organization be said to “learn”? What and how 
does it learn? They get around this paradox by examining 
what it is to be an “organization.”  An organization has 
procedures and boundaries, and significantly, it designates 
individuals to make decisions for the whole.  If 
individuals can act on behalf of an organization, then they 
can learn on behalf of an organization (Argyris & Schön, 
1996).  They distinguish between different types of 
learning: single-loop learning changes either individual 
assumptions behind organizational strategy, or changes the 
organization’s strategy.  Double-loop learning, on the 
other hand, changes values in addition to strategies and 
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assumptions.  This distinction suggests that there are 
different levels of learning and that each level depends 
greatly on the learning environment.  
Peter Senge (1992)brought the term “learning 
organization” into mainstream usage and offered the 
characteristics of such an organization.    Senge named 
five “disciplines” of a learning organization: 1) personal 
mastery of individual vision and of objective reality; 2) 
mental models, or assumptions affecting how we see the 
world; 3) building a shared vision of the future; 4) team 
learning and dialogue, and 5) systems thinking, or being 
able to “see the organization’s patterns as a whole…from 
within the organization.”  This fifth discipline 
incorporates the other four and is critical to the 
organization’s evolving as a learning organization with a 
learning culture.   For Senge, managers must learn to 
strategize, not merely within the scope of their own 
responsibilities, but about the whole system and in the 
long term. 
Organizational culture may be the single greatest factor 
in how an organization learns.  It is difficult to pinpoint 
the characteristics of an organizational culture.  
Certainly, beliefs, values, and norms about performance 
management are likely to comprise a portion of the 
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organizational culture, especially for larger 
organizations.  Sackmann (1992) turns to the concept of 
sense-making to explain what is at the heart of an 
organizational culture:  Individuals make sense of what 
they experience through cognition.   Cognitive aids might 
include labeling things or events, attaching causes to 
events, or developing lessons learned to take away from 
events.  When these cognitive aids are common to a group, 
they comprise some of the collective knowledge that guides 
the behavior and thinking of the group. Sackmann 
distinguished between four types of cultural knowledge.  
Dictionary knowledge takes the form of definitions and 
labels. Directory knowledge identifies cause and effect 
relationships and establishes how things happen or are 
done.   Recipe knowledge describes the cause-and-effect 
relationships of possible events, or how things should be 
done.  Finally, axiomatic knowledge involves core beliefs, 
or the “why” behind how things are done.  These 
distinctions of culture and knowledge are relevant to the 
case of CARE because the organization is so layered and 
complex that those who receive evaluation reports and are 
expected act on the findings and recommendations may have 
information and knowledge needs that are worlds apart.  A 
consideration of what information looks like for the 
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respective audiences could make the difference in how CARE 
makes use of the information. 
1.4 PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
Humanitarian aid organizations have characteristics that 
distinguish them from corporations and from other 
nonprofits in terms of learning environment.  Working in a 
developing country often means confronting an 
unpredictable, chaotic setting with little infrastructure.  
Moreover, cultures and levels of development can differ so 
much from one to another that it appears impossible simply 
to apply a program to one place just because it worked in 
another (Berg, 2000).  Humanitarian aid organizations often 
have country-level offices as well as headquarters with 
divisions across sectors.  Each of these layers has a 
structure based on the competencies and responsibilities of 
the individual employees.  This can encumber learning. 
Research on learning in humanitarian aid organizations 
is as varied as are the organizations themselves.  Agencies 
can be local, working uniquely on emergencies and only in 
one country.  They can be large, as is the case with CARE 
and its contemporaries such as Oxfam and World Vision.  
These organizations often work in other areas in addition 
to emergencies and work in several regions in the world.  
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There are also governmental organizations and international 
organizations such as the United Nations.   
 One study of the UNHCR looked at the UNHCR response to 
two different crises: the 1991 conflict in northern Iraq, 
which followed the gulf war, and the Kosovo refugee 
situation of 1999.  The objective of the study was to 
determine whether any improvements in the UNHCR’s response 
in Kosovo resulted from “lessons-learned” in the Iraq 
evaluation.  The basic finding was that improvements in 
response did result from the evaluation lessons-learned, 
but that some recommendations were easier to incorporate 
than others.  For example, recommendations regarding a 
simple technical operation were easy to implement, whereas 
recommendations about early warning, which depends on 
political and external factors, were not.    
Another study, of the International Institute for 
Educational Planning, attempted to answer the question of 
whether learning takes place primarily through studying the 
organization’s training and capacity-building programs.  In 
another case, ALNAP published a volume of case studies of 
humanitarian aid agency evaluations (Wood, 2001).  Two of 
the case studies address practitioners’ reflections on the 
follow-up of evaluation recommendations and lessons-
learned.  One found that designating a formal follow-up 
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person or team assured that the recommendations would be 
revisited (Wood, 2001).  The other also recommended a 
formal follow-up structure, and further remarked that the 
timing of the evaluation report affected whether it was 
incorporated into planned decision-making meetings.   While 
these studies offer useful insights on which 
recommendations lend themselves to implementation or how to 
enhance the process of evaluating, they do not consider 
evaluation use beyond that which is direct and 
instrumental.   
It is difficult to address evaluation utilization 
without also considering how or whether an organization 
learns or has a culture of learning.  Ramalingam (2005), in 
designing a study of several international development 
agencies, asks: “how does the organization measure the 
costs and benefits of learning or of not learning? How have 
systems of monitoring and evaluation been used to map these 
costs?” Indeed, it is hard to divorce evaluation from an 
organization’s style of learning.  This also brings up the 
question of whether learning is necessarily a priority for 
NGOs.  Evaluation is already an accountability tool, and 
NGOs are more flush than ever with aid money.  There is a 
question of whether learning in and of itself is an 
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important enough goal to justify the time and expense of 
evaluation. 
 Taut and Alkin (2002) look at program staff 
impressions of what impedes evaluation implementation.  
Their study tests whether factors identified by Alkin 
(1985)as impediments to utilization are the same factors 
that impinge on effective evaluation implementation.  Their 
study of the UCLA Outreach Staff concluded that, indeed, 
the barriers to evaluation implementation mimic those of 
evaluation utilization.  Taut and Alkin suggest that the 
attitudes and perceptions of the members of an organization 
greatly affect how and whether the evaluation is conducted.  
Forss, Cracknell, and Samset (1994)also found that the 
involvement of organization members in the evaluation 
process will often spur organizational learning.   
 The recent literature on humanitarian aid reveals that 
there is an increasing interest on the part of donors, 
governments, and the public at large in greater INGO 
accountability.  The scandals in the 1990s exposed the 
dubious practices of prominent NGOs and undermined the 
public’s trust (Gibelman & Gelman, 2001).  The intense 
media scrutiny of these events resulted in an international 
community suddenly attentive to INGO efficiency and 
effectiveness. It amounted to a clarion call for NGOs to 
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hold themselves accountable to a respectable degree of 
rigor. Ebrahim (2003a) points out that NGOs had theretofore 
been assumed to have been effective at serving the world’s 
poor, and now must concretely consider how to integrate 
accountability into their operations.  
 A cornerstone of an organization’s internal system of 
accountability is its monitoring and evaluation activities.  
The sequitur from that, beyond merely determining if the 
organization can adequately and justly account for its 
actions, is the question of whether and how the 
organization then uses its evaluations to make positive 
changes in its practice.  Also, the organization may go so 
far as to employ evaluation findings to better its practice 
on the ground, but what of the policies that govern the 
organization as a whole? Ginsberg and Rhett’s 
(2003)experience suggests that evaluations appropriately 
timed and sufficiently scientific can affect legislative 
decisions in congress.  This leads one to wonder whether 
evaluations can have a similar pattern of influence within 
a large-scale organization: is there a policy level of 
influence distinct from the program level of influence for 
evaluation results, and are the indicators for success 
different at the policy level? 
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SUMMARY  
 
The body of literature on evaluation utilization is 
substantial, spanning nearly three decades.  Much of it 
focuses on instrumental use, that is, the direct link 
between research and knowledge transfer.  Shulha and 
Cousins (1997) and others have observed that context is 
critical to understanding and studying evaluation use.  Use 
is itself an overused and vague term; influence ((Henry & 
Mark, 2003; Kirkhart, 2000; Weiss et al., 2005) better 
captures the panoply of impacts an evaluation may have on 
an organization.  Weiss makes the clearest connection 
between the call for greater accountability and the 
(imposed) use of the evaluation results.  Though her 
conclusions draw from an American example of a government-
funded public program, her observation that a donor’s 
scrutiny of accountability practices can lead to an 
imposition of how evaluation results are employed going 
forward is relevant for any sort of agency receiving some 
public funding.   
If dialoguing in terms of evaluation influence, rather 
than in terms of evaluation use, more accurately reflects 
how evaluation is a tool for nonprofits to make the world 
better, the question becomes what exactly “influence” looks 
like. Kirkhart attempts to answer that question with her 
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integrated theory, providing a generalist framework 
depicting influence as a function of time, source of 
influence, and intent, with subcategories within those. 
Mark and Henry, also, frame influence, projecting it in 
levels of communication or interaction.  Both of these 
frameworks, in theory, can adapt to a specific context. 
This paper will use Kirkhart’s framework to develop a 
context-specific map of CARE’s emergency response 
evaluation influence, informed by Mark and Henry’s 
interpersonal categories.  Mark and Henry’s model will 
serve as a springboard for developing a theoretical 
framework for evaluation in the humanitarian assistance and 
emergency response context. Kirkhart’s model serves as a 
point of departure for a discussion on evaluation influence 
writ large; Henry and Mark’s framework helps to ascertain 
whether evaluations go beyond accountability and what 
factors lead them to do so. 
The media frenzy over the scandal-riddled 1990s for 
NGOs appropriately coincided with emerging scholarship on 
evaluation influence.  Though it is established that there 
is desire on the part of donors, governments, and the 
public for greater and more consistent INGO accountability, 
a larger question remains as to whether the INGO’s holding 
itself more accountable in fact improves on its practice 
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and furthers its mission. There is a dearth of study on 
just how NGOs account for their actions and, more 
importantly, whether their accountability efforts lead to 
better practice and positive societal change. This study 
looks at both accountability and evaluation influence in 
the specific context of CARE’s emergency response 
activities.     
The literature supports the theory that there is great 
interest in INGO accountability and a need for structures 
that support that as well as better understanding of what 
it looks like. The evaluation literature shows a 
progression of thinking on evaluation utilization, with 
current attention to how to study evaluation influence.  
But the “so what?” question is whether established 
accountability systems on the part of the INGO results in 
better practice and ultimately in the NGOs improving on 
fulfilling their mission.  It is also possible that 
evaluations influence the organization and beyond in ways, 
intended or unintended, that transcend the traditional and 
tangible notion of direct, instrumental use. These less-
observable forms of influence may represent valuable ways 
in which evaluations affect individuals, the organization, 
or the broader INGO community, whether through 
participation in the evaluation process or through exposure 
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to evaluation findings in a report. This study contributes 
an empirical approach to tracing “pathways” of influence in 
a large, transnational organization to the literature on 
evaluation influence and on NGOs.
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
As previously stated, this study aims to examine how 
humanitarian aid evaluation reports, and the process of 
conducting them, influence the aid agency’s policies and 
practice.  By applying Henry and Mark’s mechanisms for 
influencing to the case of CARE’s humanitarian relief work, 
the study identifies factors that lead (or do not lead) to 
the application of the evaluation findings and also 
investigates unintended ways in which the evaluations 
affect the organization.  This study is important because 
the effectiveness of disaster relief is important for 
millions of people who are the victims of disaster and 
evaluation provides one of the best ways for improving 
policies and practices that can in turn improve the 
outcomes for those affected by disasters. A deeper 
understanding of how and why evaluation reports effectively 
inform and improve practice (or why they do not) can help 
NGOs to operate more efficiently and with greater 
accountability to their donors and to their beneficiaries.  
Evaluation recommendations can improve practice by showing 
an agency where to change ineffective practice and when to 
replicate things done well. It is certainly the hope that 
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evaluations facilitate an agency’s being accountable to its 
donors, beneficiaries, and the public. But it may also be 
the case that evaluations have a valuable role beyond that 
for improving policy and practice. 
 
Theories of and Frameworks for Influence 
 
 The research specifically looks at how and whether 
evaluations influence humanitarian aid organizations and 
the environment in which they operate. Evaluations also 
affect this environment.  Ultimately, the research probes 
whether this call for increased accountability on the part 
of NGOs does in fact lead to a positive difference in how 
they practice.   To do this, Kirkhart’s Integrated Theory 
of Influence will serve as an initial frame for sorting out 
the ways in which ‘influence’ differs from ‘use’ in 
describing what sort of impact an evaluation may have for 
humanitarian relief.  An earlier version of this study 
proposed to use Kirkhart’s theory to describe the patterns 
of influence at CARE; however, her theory proved difficult 
to operationalize for this purpose.  Her theory is entirely 
relevant to the discussion on influence versus use and to 
the broader conversation about the need for useful and 
accurate theories and models of influence.  Her theory is 
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used here merely to help shape the final analysis by 
providing points of discussion for what influence looks 
like in practice   
For the specific case of CARE, Henry and Mark’s 
Pathways of Influence serve as the guide for identifying 
what evaluation influence looks like within CARE’s 
emergency assistance practice. Their framework provides a 
sort of menu of possible mechanisms through which 
evaluations may influence an agency and the broader policy 
community in which it functions.  This study will consider 
each of the menu items for their relevance and 
applicability to the context of the large transnational 
humanitarian aid agency. Henry and Mark maintain that 
culling from social science research yields ‘pathways’ 
which help to shed light on the various forms evaluation 
influence can take.  They limit their discussion of 
evaluation influence to that influence which is relevant to 
‘social betterment,’ an important narrowing of scope given 
vast number of ways in which ‘influence’ might manifest 
itself.  Henry and Mark’s work is particularly germane to 
the humanitarian assistance INGO because responding 
responsibly to emergencies is by its nature a gesture 
toward social betterment.  Since they are likely to conduct 
the evaluations for accountability reasons alone, such 
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organizations stand to benefit a great deal from better 
understanding how their evaluations influence their 
policies and programs. Further cultivating the aspects of 
their evaluation process which favor eventual program and 
policy improvement would amount to better furthering their 
humanitarian missions. 
To identify factors leading to the effective 
utilization of evaluation processes and reports in 
humanitarian relief agencies, CARE International’s 
emergency response division serves as an extensive case 
study of evaluation impact.  CARE is a significant case 
because it is a major deliverer of relief and has a high 
profile for this type of work.  Because of its non-
hierarchical organizational structure and its presence in 
multiple locations, it does not mirror the structure of 
other INGOs, and it is in a way a series of cases within 
one. That is, CARE is so decentralized that the regional 
and country offices act with great autonomy and, therefore, 
are somewhat independent in the extent to which they are 
influenced by evaluation.   It is nevertheless a good case 
to study for these questions, as it is a central player in 
the humanitarian assistance world, and because looking at 
several layers within the one organization offers a good 
opportunity for discovering instances of influence at more 
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than one level.  There are other similarly de centralized 
INGOs (e.g. Oxfam) who presumably would have similar 
evaluation challenges and patterns.  Within the multi-
tiered organization, there are sometimes simultaneous 
relief efforts occurring.  The professional staff brings a 
wealth of expertise to its emergency response efforts, from 
procurement experts to security personnel to advocacy 
representatives to evaluators.  In contrast to many of its 
peers, the organization has commissioned thorough 
evaluations for each and every one of its emergency 
response activities for the past seven years, with the 
larger-scale relief efforts evaluated more than once in 
different formats.  This offers a host of evaluation 
reports for study and comparison.  
 
3.2 Rationale for Qualitative Design 
This study employs a qualitative design.  The research 
is based on (1) a series of interviews of individuals who 
conduct the evaluations or receive/theoretically use the 
evaluation findings as well as (2) a content analysis of 
current evaluation reports.  Though a quantitative approach 
would also be possible for this research, such as through a 
quantitatively-analyzed written survey of those who conduct 
and receive evaluation reports in the organization, the 
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choice of a qualitative design is appropriate given the 
lack of theory in the field.   Moreover, while there is a 
great deal of research on evaluation utilization, very 
little of it looks at evaluation use using a specific 
organization or agency as a case, and none of it looks at 
the international humanitarian assistance context.   
The great advantage to using the CARE case to look at 
evaluation influence is that CARE has a similar approach to 
emergency response wherever it works, regardless of the 
type of emergency or the geographical location of the 
emergency. Some of the same personnel deploy to emergencies 
in very different contexts.  Moreover, the evaluations of 
each of CARE’s emergency response efforts are similarly 
formatted, with evaluators often involved in assessing more 
than one emergency.  All of this overlap helps to assure 
that, though the emergencies can vary greatly in terms of 
type of emergency, scale and setting, there are constants 
such as the response and evaluation formats that make them 
comparable within CARE.  
This context also means that evaluators are working in 
a variety of settings, from natural disasters to conflict 
situations to famines and droughts. The evaluators are 
preparing reports that have to meet the needs of several 
audiences, such as for executives or administrators who do 
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not frequent the field.  Consequently, the perception of an 
evaluation report’s utility could vary according to the 
station or the needs of the individual receiving the 
report. This difference in perception of quality is far 
easier to capture in an interview than in a survey or 
similarly impersonal instrument.   
3.3 Research Purpose 
The purpose of this research is to identify what 
factors, if any, enhance or reduce the influence of 
evaluation processes and reports on practices, programs and 
policies within a large INGO. The study examines the 
process leading up to completion of the evaluation report 
for its contribution to the influence the evaluation has as 
a whole on the organization.  The research will capture the 
perspectives of the evaluator, the decision-maker who could 
call for changes based on evaluation reports, and the 
implementer who would make those changes out in the field. 
The research can inform CARE, but could be relevant to any 
INGO working in the humanitarian assistance arena.  It 
should also have relevance for nonprofits in general in 
that it helps to develop a theory of influence within a 
specific organization in a particular context.  This study 
has been developed to enhance our understanding of the ways 
in which evaluations influence humanitarian aid agencies.  
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The study endeavors to contribute to the development of 
theory about evaluation influence.  Presently, the theories 
about how evaluation influence works have been laid out, 
notably by Kirkhart and more thoroughly by Henry and Mark, 
but little testing has been done on the existing theories 
so as to confirm or refine them.  This study represents one 
effort to do so.  
3.4 Research Questions 
This research proposes to address two main questions:  
A. Do evaluations of INGOs’ disaster relief activities 
go beyond accountability to affect INGOs’ practice? 
B. If evaluations of disaster relief activities do 
improve subsequent projects, what elements of the 
evaluation process or report contribute to the 
evaluation’s influence on programs and policies? 
 
With these questions serving as an overarching guide, the  
 
research applies Henry and Mark’s Pathways of Influence to 
the emergency response context.  The framework provides a 
template for “mapping” the patterns of influence at CARE, 
steering the discussion toward possible explanations of 
whether, why and how influence did or did not occur.  
Though the study looks at all evaluation reports on 
humanitarian activity that CARE completed between 2000 and 
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2005, it examines the example of Tropical Storm Jeanne in 
greater depth.  The reason for highlighting this study is 
that it provides an example of two different evaluation 
approaches: an after-action review and a final evaluation.  
Moreover, in the five preliminary exploratory interviews 
preceding this study, more than one CARE employee touted 
Tropical Storm Jeanne as an example of an influential 
evaluation.  
The research draws primarily from two sources of data: 
I. CARE has its own repository of evaluation reports 
from emergency response evaluations conducted over 
the past five years.  A meta-analysis tool (see 
Appendix) identifies the characteristics of these 
evaluations.  The meta-analysis checklist will help 
in discerning the patterns in the lessons-learned 
and evaluation findings that should theoretically be 
feeding back into the organization’s programming and 
policy-making.   
 
II. A stakeholder analysis will be the basis for the 
second source of data, a series of interviews with 
CARE personnel.  These interviews target a 
representative group of persons at various levels of 
the organization’s emergency relief programming.  
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Interviews focus on evaluation report terms of 
reference, dissemination, format, timing, and end 
use. 
 
 
For the first exercise, the study will look at all 
of CARE’s evaluation reports from its emergency response 
from 2000-2005.  The different categories of evaluations 
are as follows: 
A. Final Evaluation (FE). These long, thorough papers 
were generated from evaluations conducted after an 
intervention has concluded.   
B. After Action Review (AAR). Also called Lessons-
Learned Workshops, these evaluations are typically 
reflection sessions taking place shortly after an 
intervention and including many or all of the staff 
involved in the intervention.  The reports stemming 
from AARs are typically shorter than those of final 
evaluations, and can be in worksheet form as small 
groups reflect on their experiences.  
C. Real Time Evaluations (RTE). These assessments take 
place during an intervention and are meant to take 
stock of progress toward project goals. 
D. Multi Agency Evaluations (MAE).  These involve 
several prominent agencies assessing their joint 
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level of effectiveness in responding to a large-
scale emergency, i.e. the Asian tsunami. 
 A meta-analysis of these evaluations, using 
Kirkhart’s Integrated Theory of Influence as a guiding 
structure, informed the interviews for the study employing 
Henry and Mark’s Pathways of Influence. Her theory, 
stemming from the notion that influence is a broader and 
more accurate term than use for the many direct and 
indirect consequences of evaluation, names three dimensions 
of influence that target both the impact of evaluation 
findings and the unintended results of the evaluation 
process.  To map how and whether influence occurs or is 
perceived to occur within CARE, the research analyzes the 
meta-evaluation data and the interview data through the 
lens of Kirkhart’s Integrated Theory of Influence framework 
and its three dimensions. 
The first dimension, the source of influence, targets 
the evaluation characteristic that is the foundation for 
the evaluation’s influence in the organization.   The two 
data sources provide material for identifying which 
evaluation findings (if any) are being utilized and why.  
Both the process of evaluating and the corresponding 
results are the potential sources of influence.  The second 
dimension, the intention, looks at the systems (or lack 
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thereof) in place in the organization for affecting the 
utilization of evaluation lessons-learned.  It also 
attempts to identify any unintended or unsystematic uses of 
findings within the organization.  The third dimension, 
time, considers the chronology of the evaluations and their 
eventual uses, taking into account short-term, 
intermediate, and long-term periods of time.  Interview 
responses are coded into each of Kirkhart’s dimensions and 
sub-dimensions, and the 22 evaluation reports are similarly 
catalogued.   
Using Kirkhart’s influence framework as a lens for 
examining humanitarian response evaluations allows for a 
structured way of looking at whether her three dimensions 
account for the factors of distribution and dissemination, 
format, timing, and decision-making patterns, as well as 
any other factors that emerge.  The extent to which her 
framework explains what happens in the utilization of 
emergency response evaluations can be instructive in 
pinpointing what is unique to this genre of evaluations, 
and what is universal.   Furthermore, her treatment of 
process use as parallel to (rather than as an afterthought 
to) results-based use is an interesting test for an 
organization self-professed to be results-oriented.   
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Specifically, the analysis consists of reviewing the 
coded interview and evaluation report data and sorting it 
into a matrix using Kirkhart’s categories: 
SOURCE OF INFLUENCE 
• Process 
• Results 
INTENTION 
• Intended 
• Unintended 
TIME 
• Immediate 
• End-of-Cycle 
• Long-term 
 
3.5 Framework and Data 
The aim of the meta-analysis of evaluation reports was 
to catalogue their content and format so as to have a 
picture of CARE’s current evaluation scene.  This allowed a 
subsequent construction of a context-specific theory of 
influence for CARE’s emergency response, using Kirkhart’s 
framework as the underpinning.  Appendix B is the meta-
evaluation checklist used as a basis for reviewing these 25 
evaluations.  The checklist combines criteria from the 
following sources:  
1) MEGA Evaluations.  Beginning in 2000, CARE hired an 
independent consultant to conduct a meta-analysis of 
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its evaluations three times.  These MEGAs (Meta-
Evaluations of Goal Achievement in CARE Projects) 
include, but are not limited to, emergency 
evaluations.  Among the recommendations of the MEGAs 
is that all CARE evaluations contain a “lessons 
learned” section.  This is, in fact, characteristic of 
CARE’s more recent disaster evaluations.  But are the 
lessons really learned? If so, what does the learning 
look like? If not, what might CARE do to ensure that 
the lessons are better learned in the future?  
2) ALNAP Quality Proforma. In 2001, ALNAP developed a 
tool designed to help organizations determine the 
quality of their evaluation reports.  The Proforma 
purports to tap into current internationally 
recognized best practices. 
3) CARE International Evaluation Standards.  CARE 
International has a set of standards to which the 
organization as a whole adheres, in principle. 
The primary objective of this first exercise was to 
establish the patterns and types of lessons-learned and 
recommendations in CARE humanitarian aid evaluations. 
 For the second data source, a preliminary scan of the 
above-mentioned 22 evaluations resulted in the following 
interviewee categories:  
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• senior management;  
• external relations;  
• finance;  
• human resources;  
• security;  
• procurement and logistics;  
• learning and knowledge management;  
• country and program directors;  
• evaluators.   
 
An intern at CARE also scanned the content of the 
evaluation reports for patterns.  Her observations and 
conclusions confirmed those of the researcher. 
In addition to the scan of the 22 evaluations, the 
researcher conducted five pre-interviews with individuals 
representing different pieces in CARE’s evaluation process.  
The researcher identified these five individuals with the 
help of Jock Baker, CARE International’s Coordinator for 
Monitoring and Evaluation for emergencies.  The 30 total 
interviewees, representing various facets of the emergency 
response process (and varying levels of authority within 
the organization), answered questions about evaluation use 
within the organization.  Appendix D is a list of interview 
questions for the second data source.  The interview 
questions have sub-probes which account for the different 
individuals’ roles within the organization.  The researcher 
conducted all of the interviews personally, though CARE’s 
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Coordinator for Monitoring and Evaluation of emergencies 
accompanied her for the first three interviews to assure 
that she was interviewing effectively and taking notes that 
reflected actual discussion. Rather than collect audio 
recordings of the interviews, which would have been 
exceedingly difficult given that several of the interviews 
with individuals residing overseas took place by telephone, 
the researcher took handwritten or typed notes during the 
dialogue and then filled in the notes with detail 
immediately after the interview.  In the evening of the day 
following an interview, the researcher typed up the notes 
and e-mailed them to the interviewee so that he or she 
could review the notes for accuracy and any additional 
comments.  Though the fact that the researcher conducted 
the interviews personally calls into question the 
impartiality of the data, she suggests that it also assures 
consistency given the semi-structured nature of the 
questioning. 
Henry and Mark present a theory of influence for 
evaluation that specifically hones in on which elements of 
evaluation affect what they term ‘social betterment,’ the 
“…improvement of social conditions.” This makes their 
theory an appropriate vehicle for studying the case of 
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CARE, an INGO whose primary mission is to serve the poor.  
ANALYSIS 
Henry and Mark liken an evaluation to an intervention 
in that an evaluation effects change, for better or for 
worse.  That change might come from the process of 
evaluating or from the evaluations findings; it might be 
intentional or unintentional.  Henry and Mark propose a 
theory that is to be recognizable in numerous settings.  
Their theory includes a number of different forms 
evaluation influence might take, allowing one to use their 
framework as a guide to formulating a case-specific theory 
of influence.  This study puts forth a theory for the case 
of CARE which has implications for similar INGOs and other 
nonprofits. 
Drawing from several social science traditions, Henry 
and Mark delineate three levels of evaluation influence: 
individual, interpersonal, and collective. The individual 
level involves a single person altering his or her thoughts 
or behavior as a result of participating in an evaluation 
or being exposed to evaluation findings.  The interpersonal 
level includes the effect of the evaluation on the 
relationship between individuals.  The collective level 
refers to change occurring in an organization as a result 
of the process or findings of an evaluation. Henry and Mark 
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break down each of these levels by means of a taxonomy that 
lays out the forms of influence specific to each level.  It 
is this taxonomy that serves as the fundamental framework 
for analysis of whether and how evaluation influence occurs 
in an emergency response organization.  
Analysis of the meta-evaluations and interviews draws 
from Henry and Mark’s discussion of possible pathways of 
influence and their corresponding framework.  Their 
taxonomy of three levels of influence with corresponding 
forms of influence offers a sort of checklist for 
identifying influence instances through the interviews of 
CARE personnel.  The interview data will be aligned with 
the evaluation reports themselves for an exploration of 
whether the evaluation influences pinpointed in the 
interview data are consistent with the lessons-learned and 
recommendations put forth in the evaluation reports.  
The analysis considers each mechanism within each 
level of influence in Henry and Mark’s framework. 
Specifically: 
INDIVIDUAL – there are six potential outcomes of evaluation 
at this level. 
Direction or valence of an attitude change – this research 
scans each interview for examples of a change in attitude, 
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positive or negative, about the intervention being 
evaluated or about the disaster relief program as a whole.   
Behavior change – this looks not merely at attitude, but at 
change in how an individual acts as a direct result of 
participating in an evaluation or reading an evaluation 
report.   
Salience – this category refers to the importance an 
individual gives to an idea. In the case of CARE and 
emergency response, interview data will be culled for 
whether evaluation findings raised or lowered the 
priorities of the interviewees vis-à-vis CARE’s disaster 
relief approach and strategies.   
Elaboration – this refers to the extent to which a person 
thinks about or mentally processes a given issue.  This is 
particularly pertinent to the CARE case, as one of their 
key evaluation formats, the After Action Review, has 
thoughtful reflection as a central component of the 
evaluation process. 
Priming – this mechanism brings a given idea or concept to 
the forefront, setting it up to have an impact on judgments 
or decisions.  For the CARE case, priming could have as 
much to do with the evaluation reports as with the 
interview data; executive summaries may highlight certain 
issues and give cursory treatment to others. 
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Skill acquisition – this refers to increasing one’s 
competence in a skill area via participating in the process 
of evaluation.  For the case of CARE, this mechanism has a 
natural home with the After Action Review, which typically 
has small group work and could lead to enhanced 
collaboration skills. 
INTERPERSONAL – the types of influence falling under the 
interpersonal column include: 
Justification – this involves using the conclusions from an 
evaluation report to back up one’s prior convictions about 
an issue. This can be either a positive or a negative 
phenomenon.  Though an important role for evaluation 
findings, justification may be difficult to observe through 
interview data because few if any of the interviewees would 
have been in a position to use an evaluation report this 
way.  
Persuasion - This refers to attitude change that one 
individual attempts to bring about in another; evaluation 
findings can be a central tool here.  In the case of CARE, 
this might be a way in which an evaluation of one response 
might yield findings that one individual uses to persuade 
another to act in a certain manner for a future emergency 
response. 
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Change agent – this is where participating in an evaluation 
or reading the findings from an evaluation can lead an 
individual to take focused action on bringing change about.  
For the CARE case, this could manifest itself in country 
directors who help to lead CARE’s response for an 
emergency, and then find themselves in other emergencies 
later. 
Social norms – these are agreed-upon principles about how 
to conduct oneself in a given setting. This could be 
difficult to observe through interview data, as change in 
norms can be so subtle that those involved are not aware of 
the change taking place. 
Minority-opinion influence – This mechanism has to do with 
altering the opinion of those whose attitude does not align 
with the majority.  Evaluation findings can be a tool for 
encouraging attitude change.   
COLLECTIVE ACTION – there are four versions of influence at 
this level. 
Agenda setting – this is about getting an issue on the 
docket for public and/or government consideration, whether 
through the media or by some other means.  For CARE, this 
might not trace back specifically to evaluation findings, 
because the organization is arranged in such a way that 
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those involved with public and media relations are not 
always direct recipients of evaluation reports, nor do they 
typically participate in the process. 
Policy-oriented learning – this refers to attitude change 
about policy objectives that come about because of 
evaluation results.  In the case of CARE, more than one 
evaluation report might be needed to effect such a change. 
Policy change – related to the above two mechanisms, this 
form of influence involves an actual shift in policy in the 
operating environment that results from evaluation 
findings. Henry and Mark point out that negative evaluation 
findings might well bring about policy change more than do 
positive findings. 
diffusion – like policy change, this involves a policy 
shift, but diffusion is about the spread of policy change 
beyond the operating environment to other contexts.  For 
CARE, this could be other INGOs.  This study uses the 
above-described taxonomy as a checklist that parses the 
interview data so as to identify which forms of influence 
evaluations have within CARE, if any.   
Coding of Interview Data 
To code the interview data, the researcher created a 
coding scheme based on Henry and Mark’s theory of 
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evaluation influence.  She assumed that not all of their 
categories might appear in this particular set of data.  
She assigned decision-making criteria to each category so 
as to discern where to place each piece of interview data.  
In the instances where there was overlap (for example, the 
same instance of influence occurring at both an individual 
level and at an interpersonal level), she coded the piece 
of data for both categories.  She created an “other” 
category for any data that seemed not to fit Henry and 
Mark’s categories.  In the final analysis, this “other” 
category became the source for speculation about creating 
additional categories for a theory representing the 
dynamics of evaluation influence in humanitarian relief 
INGOs.   These coded interviews are then matched with the 
evaluation reports to identify instances of intended 
influence.  The following is the coding schema for the 
interview data: 
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Table 1. Coding Scheme for Interview Data 
 
 
INFLUENCES CODE DECISION-MAKING 
CRITERIA 
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
Attitude  
Change 
IND-AC Any reference at all to 
individual attitude about 
a program are coded IND-
AC.  
 
These are then culled for 
instances of actual shift 
in attitude resulting from 
either from participating 
in an evaluation or from 
learning of the 
evaluation’s findings. 
Salience 
 
IND-S 
Distinct from IND-AC, this 
goes beyond a change in 
attitude and is about a 
priority shift. Example: 
an issue as an agenda item 
at a major planning 
meeting as a result of an 
evaluation lesson-learned. 
Elaboration 
 
IND-E Thinking about an issue or 
situation because of 
participation in an 
evaluation or because of 
having read a report. 
Priming 
 
IND-P Any instance of an issue 
rising to the forefront as 
a result of positioning 
(such as prominence in an 
executive summary) or 
because of the event 
circumstances themselves 
(as with the heavily 
media-covered 2004 
tsunami). 
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Table 1.  
 
Skill  
Acquisition 
IND-SA Newly learned or honed 
skills, such as SWAT 
analysis in an AAR 
Behavioral  
Change 
IND-BC Documented instance of 
change in operating 
procedure as a result of 
an evaluation.  Should 
match up with an 
evaluation report. 
   Justification 
 
INT-J Use of evaluation findings 
in meetings or elsewhere 
to make a case for an 
action or priority 
Persuasion 
 
INT-P Like INT-J, but goes 
further: not merely a 
presentation but an 
attempt to change others’ 
minds 
I
n
t
e
r
p
e
r
s
o
n
a
l
 
Change  
Agent 
INT-CA Participation in an 
evaluation, as an 
evaluator or an 
interviewee, or as a 
person reading findings, 
leading an individual or 
group to initiate a change 
effort. 
Social  
Norms 
INT-SN Example of an evaluation 
affecting social behavior 
of those in contact with 
it. 
Minority- 
Opinion  
Influence 
INT-MOI Like INT-P, but specific 
to a group whose position 
is that of the minority. 
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Table 1. 
 
C
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
 Agenda  
Setting 
C-AS An issue emerging from an 
evaluation that shows up 
on a meeting agenda for 
CARE and / or for other 
INGOs implicated in the 
effort 
Policy-
Oriented 
Learning 
C-POL One or more evaluation 
report(s) leads to 
increased understanding at 
the policy-making level of 
the organization. 
Policy  
Change 
C-PC Like C-POL, but with 
actual policy change, not 
merely learning. 
Diffusion 
 
C-D Policy, program, or 
practice change resulting 
from a different 
evaluation, either at CARE 
or at related agencies. 
OTHER OTH  
 
 
3.5 EXPECTED FINDINGS 
 Transcripts from five preliminary interviews suggest 
that more influence occurs at the individual and 
interpersonal levels than at the collective level.  Indeed, 
the analysis that follows concludes that it is easier to 
identify examples of influence at the individual level and, 
to an extent, at the interpersonal level than it is at the 
collective level.  Within these three levels, process-
related influence forms are more relevant to some CARE 
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types of evaluations, whereas evaluation findings, end 
results, are more pertinent to other forms.  The analysis 
following will put forth a fourth level that clarifies the 
complex dynamics of influence within a large transnational 
INGO.  It remains to be seen whether the conclusions will 
be generalizeable to other INGOs working in the same 
capacity as CARE.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FINDINGS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The findings for this research are presented two 
parts: findings from the initial review of the 25 
evaluations CARE conducted on its emergency response 
activities from 2000-2005, and the data from the 25 
interviews that sounded out Henry and Mark’s framework for 
evaluation influence.  The section on the content of the 22 
evaluations includes a detailed look at CARE’s response to 
Tropical Storm Jeanne in Haiti.  The five pre-interviews 
resulted in the choice of the Tropical Storm Jeanne 
evaluation as a highlight; three of the five individuals 
selected proposed that particular evaluation as a good 
example of how it “should” be done and of the potential 
evaluation has as a tool for organizational improvement.  
Though there is a graphic representation of the interview 
data included in this chapter, the bulk of the data can be 
found in the appendices.  
The analysis concludes that there are more instances 
of evaluation influence at the individual and interpersonal 
levels than at the collective level; that is, the influence 
of the evaluation reports is not reaching the policymaking 
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level of the organization or of its peer community.  The 
perception among the interviewees was largely that 
evaluation report findings are under-used, if they are used 
at all.   
What is perhaps most intriguing about the findings is 
that the Mark and Henry framework brings out subtle and 
unintended forms of evaluation influence that not only have 
implications for how the organization might evaluation more 
efficiently and effectively in the future, but also point 
to where in the chain of events the evaluations fall short 
of provoking policy-level change.  The Henry and Mark 
framework proves to be, for the most part, adaptable to the 
context of the large transnational INGO, and their “menu,” 
with the addition of a context-specific level of influence, 
turns out to be a useful tool for identifying instances and 
forms of evaluation influence.  For this study, the 
framework was awkward as a tool for subsequently mapping 
“pathways” of influence, but nevertheless was useable for 
this case.  Also, perhaps just as interesting as the 
instances of influence that emerged were the “non-
instances” – that is, the undercurrents hinted at by 
interviewees that did not fit neatly into the framework’s 
mechanisms.  These ‘non-events’ coupled with the 
identifiable mechanisms of influence tell an interesting 
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story of how evaluations affect the organization, as well 
as how they potentially could. 
4.2 Evaluation Reports 
 
The initial meta-evaluation of the evaluation reports 
served the purpose of assessing the general themes among 
the recommendations and lessons-learned in the reports, as 
well as providing a snapshot of the gamut of format and 
quality characteristics of the reports. The checklist 
employed for the meta-evaluation, described in detail in 
chapter 3, drew from four sources relevant to the 
evaluations’ goals and standards.  The evaluation reports 
varied widely in terms of content and format, not 
surprising given that the evaluators themselves varied a 
great deal in their experience and style.  Also, almost all 
of the reports were written before CARE International 
instituted an overarching evaluation policy2. Though the 
variation made comparison challenging, there were 
recognizable themes throughout the reports. There are three 
types of evaluations represented: 
 
                                                   
2 CARE’s Senior Advisor for Design, Monitoring and 
Evaluation paired with CARE’s evaluation specialist to 
produce a set of evaluation standards for CARE 
International.  The standards are meant to apply to all 
evaluations undertaken within CARE International.  These 
standards were formally accepted in 2006. 
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After Action Reviews, also called Lessons-Learned 
Workshops, are weekend-long reflection sessions taking 
place right after an emergency intervention.  At least a 
cross-section, if not all, of the individuals involved in 
the intervention are invited to participate.  The aim of 
the After Action Review is to assess the intervention while 
it is still fresh in people’s minds, think about how to 
improve on it, and identify opportunities acted upon and 
opportunities lost. Of the evaluation reports reviewed, 10   
were After Action Reviews, with six of those from CARE’s 
response in various countries to the Asian tsunami of 2004. 
 
Real Time Evaluations take place in the middle of an 
intervention and are intended to be a check-in on how the 
intervention is progressing and on what might be improved 
upon.  It takes place in the middle of the process and 
involves just a few individuals (in contrast to an After 
Action Review, the Real Time Evaluation cannot involve a 
large number of employees because most are occupied with 
the intervention. In an emergency situation, the luxury of 
involving all participants would mean a lesser response).  
It is meant to inform the rest of the intervention. 
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Final Evaluations occur after the intervention has taken 
place and any temporary employees have gone on to other 
projects.  The goal is to capsulate the intervention and to 
gather information for informing later planning efforts.  
Final evaluations usually involve an external3 evaluator. An 
example of a Final Evaluation:  
 
Evaluation of CARE Afghanistan’s Emergency 
Response, September 2002 
This final evaluation of CARE’s Afghanistan 
response resulted in a 64-page final report.  An 
external evaluator and an internal evaluator 
teamed up to conduct the evaluation.   The 
extensive evaluation consisted of a site visit, 
telephone and in-person interviews, surveys of 
CARE staff and of beneficiaries, and a document 
review.   The summary of recommendations makes 
the substantial length of the final report more 
manageable for the reader.   The evaluation 
report concludes that CARE’s overall response was 
effective and that CARE is well-received in 
Afghanistan.  Highlights from the recommendations 
include clarification of lines of authority and 
roles, especially with temporary staff, and 
contingency plans for emergency responses. 
 
                                                   
3 Michael Scriven (1991) distinguishes between internal 
evaluators, employed by the organization, and external 
evaluators, coming from outside of the organization.  This 
is an important distinction in any evaluation setting, and 
CARE is no different. Several interviewees commented that 
“external” evaluators are often former CARE employees who 
found that contract work suited them better than working in 
what is perceived to be a bureaucracy.  A few interviewees 
also remarked that the organizational politics favored 
external evaluators, but that CARE is a complex 
organization for an outsider to understand immediately.    
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A subset of the Final Evaluations, called Joint 
Evaluations, is also represented; in this study, these are 
uniquely a phenomenon of the Asian Tsunami response of 
2004.  Several large-scale NGOs, prominent in their 
response to the tsunami disaster, elected to participate 
together in a joint evaluation of their efforts. A large 
goal of their efforts was to determine who did what and to 
identify competitive advantage, that is, who is better 
equipped to handle which parts of an emergency for maximum 
effectiveness.  Some of these joint evaluations were 
products of the ECB (emergency capacity-building) project, 
a Gates foundation-funded effort to improve the 
collaboration between the most far-reaching NGOs on 
emergency issues. 
The 22 CARE evaluation reports reviewed for this 
exercise (all of the evaluations conducted between 2000 and 
2005) were, for the most part, lengthy. The reports range 
from 2-page summaries to 78-page reviews, with the majority 
of the reports containing 25+ pages.  The exception to this 
is the After Action Review (AAR) summaries, which attempt 
to capture information from a few days of reflection rather 
than from the duration of an entire program.   Most of the 
reports contain an executive summary, but in some cases 
these summaries consist of a few pages highlighting the 
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report’s main lessons-learned, whereas in other cases, the 
executive summary is a mere paragraph or two generally 
explaining the study.  This suggests that those preparing 
the reports are doing so without explicit guidelines as to 
whether or how to prepare the executive summary.  The 
lessons-learned and recommendations themselves vary 
considerably as far as quantity and depth.  Moreover, only 
a few evaluations make a distinction between “lessons-
learned” and “recommendations,” and none explain what 
constitutes a “lesson-learned.”  A firm understanding of 
what a “lesson learned” is – and what it isn’t – could be a 
useful construct for CARE. Naming something a “lesson 
learned” has a different connotation from naming it a 
“recommendation”; the former implies that the message has 
been internalized and acted upon, while the latter suggests 
that the suggestion be followed up with action.  As far as 
methodology, most of the evaluations relied on interviews 
and document review, with the exception of AARs, which 
involve interactive dialogue/reflection.   
Beneficiaries 
 
The evaluation reports included the occasional call 
for greater inclusion of beneficiaries in project design: 
Afghanistan 2002, for example, recommended increasing 
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consultation with beneficiaries for emergency projects.  
Sri Lanka/India 2005 noted that the emergency response 
suffered in instances where beneficiary consultation was 
sacrificed for efficiency’s sake. However, beneficiary-
focused recommendations, or accountability to 
beneficiaries, were the exception rather than the rule in 
these reports.  It should be noted that for the evaluation 
reports falling outside of the scope of this study (for 
those projects concerned with long-term development and 
rehabilitation, beneficiaries are a more central feature in 
the recommendations).  Furthermore, though the evaluations 
seem at first glance not to focus much on emergency 
assistance beneficiaries; this could be a function of 
language confusion.  One evaluator’s “beneficiary” may be 
another evaluator’s “community,” a term with very different 
connotations.  Notably, the Hurricane Jeanne evaluation for 
Haiti mentions the needs assessment conducted with 
beneficiaries there as a “good practice” that CARE would do 
well to replicate elsewhere. 
Decision-making 
Chain of command, or lines of authority, is one of the 
most central themes to emerge from the evaluation reports.  
Moreover, recommendations to specify or clarify the chain 
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of command cut across regions, type of emergency, and time.  
Examples of lessons-learned involving chain of command 
include: 
CARE’s overall disaster planning has not established clear 
“emergency” roles, responsibilities and procedures for 
deploying staff.  Deploying emergency staff learned by 
trial and error. (India 2001) 
 
Clarify lines of authority…national offices should follow 
up with country offices on reporting deadlines (Afghanistan 
2002) 
Reporting lines within a country office should be re-
articulated as soon as possible after arrival of external 
emergency response personnel (West Bank/Gaza 2002) 
 
Facilitate clarifications of roles and responsibilities of 
CO and CERT staff (Iraq 2003) 
 
Divisions of labor need to be clearly defined (DRC 2004) 
 
Lines of responsibility and leadership should be clearly 
defined (Haiti 2004) 
The majority of the evaluation reports reviewed 
include some version of a recommendation regarding 
clarifying lines of authority, visits from senior 
management, and follow-up on responsibilities.   The 
various recommendations related to lines of authority do 
not all point to the same suggested structure, but it is 
clear that established lines of communication and reporting 
are a priority at all levels of emergency response and 
directly affect the efficacy of the response. 
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Human Resources and Personnel 
Training for staff deployed to an emergency.  This 
involves orientation to CARE and how it is organized, as 
well as familiarizing deployed personnel with local 
procedures and operations.  Training local staff, using 
local training methods as appropriate, is also a common 
theme. The Afghanistan 2002 evaluation report is 
particularly detailed in training observations and 
recommendations.  
 
The added workload for disaster response is a recurring 
concern throughout the reports reviewed: 
“Concern has been expressed that many CARE staff now remain 
with workloads exponentially increased from pre-disaster 
days…a closer examination of the current division of labour 
and staff efficiency/motivation would now be useful.” 
(Haiti Hurricane Jeanne final report) 
 
Also, four evaluation reports bring up the need for having 
a terms-of-reference (ToR) for every person deployed to an 
emergency, or having generic ToRs as part of the CO’s 
preparedness plan. 
 
The need for acceptable living conditions for deployed 
staff was a concern in three reports. Three reports 
recommended maintaining an active roster of available and 
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qualified persons for emergencies, suggesting that if such 
a thing indeed already exists, that is not always the 
perception in the moment.  Finally, three reports 
recommended having a senior staff person or senior 
management person visit the site of the emergency as early 
as possible into the response.  This sentiment is echoed in 
the interview portion of this study; buy-in on the part of 
senior management is regarded as critical to morale. 
Preparedness Planning 
 
In contrast to the interviews, only a few of the 
evaluation reports mention preparedness among the lessons-
learned; one calls for revising the CI emergency manual.  
The India lessons-learned from the tsunami response stands 
out as emphasizing the need for better preparedness in 
several areas, including procurement, policies, and long 
term strategy.  Five reports mention risk reduction and 
contingency planning as necessities for better efficiency 
in the future.  As with “beneficiaries” above, 
“preparedness planning” is a term that is just as often 
called something else, such as contingency planning or risk 
reduction.   
Procurement and Logistics 
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Procurement received little mention in the evaluation 
reports, and in general, procurement-related 
recommendations were specific to the context in which they 
were observed rather than being generalizeable CARE-wide.  
The evaluation report for Albania (2000) recommended a 
permanent procurement capacity.  The India earthquake 
report mentioned the need for a procurement database.  
Procurement was of greater priority in the interviews than 
in the evaluation reports reviewed.  Many of the logistics 
observations concerned communications and the need for 
adequate devices.  The Iraq RTE specifically recommended a 
minimum standard for procurement for critical items such as 
vehicles. 
Finance 
 
One evaluation report recommended a finance manager 
for the start of any emergency operation.  The Iraq report 
recommends bringing in an external finance manager if 
resources allow.  Some reports included situation-specific 
suggestions for soliciting funding (e.g. the 2001 Kenya 
report suggested simultaneously seeking funding for 
environmental rehabilitation).  A couple of reports 
recommended a CI emergency fund for a more immediate 
capability in disaster response situations.   
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Psychological issues 
 
Four evaluation reports mentioned the psychological 
duress characterizing emergency response staff.  The 
evaluation on Tropical Storm Jeanne, for example, comments 
that psychological support was an obvious staff need and 
was late in coming.  The Darfur Real Time Evaluation 
report, similarly, highlighted the importance of counseling 
both for the displaced Sudanese and for CARE staff for 
coping with the crisis.  The Kosovo After Action Review 
recommended the continuation of provision of counseling to 
staff.  The Multi-Agency evaluation for Thailand and 
Indonesia noted the great need for psychological healing on 
the part of both victims and response staff, noting that 
current resources are not adequate. 
Communications 
 
Communications recommendations range from observations 
about the need for reliable technology to comments about 
the criticality of a seamless flow of information.  This 
theme also emerged in the interviews.  Though many of the 
communications recommendations were situation and context-
specific, the over-arching theme was that lines of 
communication need to be established between CARE factions 
for each and every emergency response.  The Multi Agency 
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Evaluations asserted that coordination among relief 
agencies is essential to an effective response, remarking 
in more than one instance that the current level of 
coordination between agencies is not sufficient. 
Security 
 
Not surprisingly, security came up only in the 
conflict-area emergency evaluation reports, such as 
Afghanistan and West bank/Gaza.  Two reports (Afghanistan, 
Iraq) recommended that CI develop a security protocol.  The 
Darfur report expressed a desire that security plans be in 
place prior to a crisis in volatile settings such as 
Darfur.   
Project Plan 
 
Aspects of project planning / preparedness came up 
frequently in the evaluation reports.  Some distinguished 
between short-term planning and mid-to long-range planning 
strategies.  The need for a situation analysis to precede 
any response was a recurring theme.  The sentiment emerging 
from the reports is that a recognized emergency 
preparedness plan would help CARE in responding more 
rapidly to crises.   
Public Relations / Information Management 
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A number of reports mentioned a desire to cultivate 
relations with external partners in order to respond more 
efficiently.  One of the After Action Reviews recommended 
training more individuals to respond to the media’s 
questions, as the few who were trained to respond were 
fatigued.  Very little mention was made of information 
management, except in the context of the desire to improve 
internal lines of communication and reporting. 
Policy/Advocacy 
 
Policy and advocacy came up frequently in the 
evaluation reports; they emerged less in the individual 
interviews.  However, one report (Afghanistan) referred to 
advocacy as an “appropriate” response for CARE due to a 
perception on the part of other agencies that CARE is 
strong in that area.  The India earthquake evaluation 
report suggested that advocacy for beneficiaries would 
provide for informing them of their right to relief and 
assistance.  
Evaluation and learning 
 
Just two of the reports mentioned lessons learned from 
past evaluations or reviews.  Three reports called for 
building adequate evaluation resources into all emergency 
plans and budgets; corollary to that, three reports brought 
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up the need for early and/or consistent data collection as 
far as emergency response.  Finally, having minimum 
standards or guidelines for monitoring and evaluation was a 
recurring recommendation. 
Effective evaluation report utilization: Tropical Storm 
Jeanne 
 
More than one interviewee pointed to the evaluation 
and After Action Review for Tropical Storm Jeanne in Haiti 
as a model of how evaluation can effectively inform 
planning and preparedness.  What accounts for the perceived 
strength of this evaluation process? 
Timing.  The original relief effort required 500 and 
then 600 staff.  Though it seemed important to assess the 
relief effort early in the response so as to include staff 
and avoid losing information, the reality was that the 
staff was stretched to its limits with the response effort.  
An initial review in January 2005 following the September 
storm allowed for the participation of a good cross-section 
of staff, despite the fact that some had already departed.  
Moreover, the completion of the full evaluation report in 
March allowed for its use in the Haiti country office’ 
annual planning event in April.  The report identified 
resource gaps, such as storage and distribution points for 
potable water, that the planning session was able to 
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address for the following fiscal year.  The report further 
provided fodder for scenario-building and subsequent 
contingency planning by painting a visualizeable picture of 
the situation. 
Morale.  The Haiti After-Action Review and thorough 
subsequent evaluation both provided a forum for staff to 
reflect and highlighted what they had done well in the 
response, rather than remaining limited to listing where 
their response effort had fallen short. 
Communicability.  In addition to including a local 
(and francophone) staff person on the evaluation team, CARE 
Haiti had the final evaluation report translated into 
French, which allowed for ease in sharing it both with 
local staff and with partners, such as the UN and other 
NGOs. 
It is interesting to note that neither the interviews 
nor the evaluations themselves for Tropical Storm Jeanne 
particularly followed Kirkhart’s proposed dimensions for 
evaluation influence, despite the evaluation’s repeatedly 
having been touted among interviewees as a good example of 
an evaluation that “worked.” 
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B. Interview data 
The interviews, conducted between March 2006 and 
August 2006, tapped 25 individuals identified through 
preliminary research and data-gathering as having a range 
of roles within the CARE international emergency response 
structure.   
Interviewees represented different tiers of the emergency 
response framework within CARE.  Respondents ranged from 
those on the “front lines” directly involved with the 
emergency response to those on the executive level.  There 
were 30 formal interviews supplemented with several 
informal conversations and interview follow-up discussions.  
Interviews were conducted both by telephone and in person, 
and averaged about 45 minutes apiece.  The interview 
protocol (see Appendix) provided a loose format for the 
semi-structured discussions.   
The most common refrain from the interviews was the 
desire for shorter, more pointed evaluation reports.  Those 
on the front lines remarked that they did not have the 
luxury of time to read lengthy reports and do their jobs in 
the field; those at the executive level commented that they 
did not need 40 pages worth of information in order to use 
the reports to make good policy judgments.  One person 
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specifically recommended a maximum length of 20 pages; most 
wished simply for recommendations to be on top, separate 
from the main text body.   Three interviewees called for 
the recommendations to be categorized by job 
responsibilities, such as finance, human resources, 
security, etc. 
Corollary to the length, many interviewees felt that 
the distribution of evaluation reports is inconsistent.  
Some were not sure whether they receive the reports 
consistently or not.  Very few of the interviewees seemed 
to know where to look if they wanted to locate a repository 
of reports; only one interviewee mentioned Livelink (CARE’s 
repository for the reports and other information) 
specifically.   
The focus of the evaluation reports was also of 
concern to many of the interviewees.  The overarching 
sentiment was that they did not have time to read through 
and pick out the lessons-learned that applied to their 
specific tasks, nor the time to go through old evaluation 
reports when dealing with a new emergency.   
Furthermore, there was a question among interviewees of 
accountability, of whose ultimate responsibility it is to 
assure that lessons are, in fact, “learned”.  
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Those interviewees working on a more operational level 
experience the evaluation reports as being mired in the 
theoretical rather than having a practical structure for 
executing the recommendations.  They described the reports 
as often being too “theoretical” or “academic.” Simple 
language was an expressed desire, as was regular 
translation into French and Spanish. 
Several interviewees mentioned a lack of a learning 
culture within CARE, a lack of structure into which 
learning could be fed and retained.  This culture, for 
many, was about attitudes and behavior rather than about 
organizational structure.  Suggestions included looking to 
other models perceived as successful, such as that of World 
Vision International (one person specifically mentioned 
WVI’s comparatively well-organized procurement system for 
emergencies) or even corporate models. 
The interviews yielded very few examples of lessons-
learned from evaluation reports that led directly to 
actions meant to address them.  Most interviewees 
acknowledged that such learning would be great, but had the 
attitude that it is not realistic.  Several interviewees 
attribute this to capacity; emergency response is ‘only a 
part of their jobs’, and they are working beyond capacity 
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as it is, so they don’t have the luxury of sifting through 
lengthy reports and learning from them.   
The desire to be more involved during the evaluation 
process was a recurring theme in the interview process.  
Three interviewees remarked that if they had been 
interviewed for an evaluation, or had been asked to 
participate in an after action review, they would have been 
more likely to read the ensuing evaluation report.  Another 
frequent refrain was the issue of accountability; there is 
no incentive for following up on recommendations, and no 
penalty for not doing so.  Interviewees offered their 
opinions of who ought to be following up to assure that 
evaluation recommendations were implemented (it was never 
the interviewee’s responsibility).  Interviewees seemed 
genuinely to want to do their job well and do it better if 
possible; evaluations were seen as time-consuming and a 
hindrance, rather than a means to that end. 
 
Henry and Mark Application 
 
 Henry and Mark’s Levels of Influence framework 
proposes to provide a sort of menu from which the evaluator 
can construct a context-specific framework to represent the 
forms of influence she observes.  That is to say that Henry 
and Mark do not suggest that all of their categories of 
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influence will be present in all settings.  Though all of 
the categories of influence in their taxonomy were 
considered in the coding scheme, not all of them were 
relevant to the line of questioning in the interviews.  
Coding the interview data to the categories in Henry and 
Mark’s framework proved to reinforce the conclusion that 
influence is occurring much more at the individual level 
than at the collective (organizational) level.   
 The coding scheme for the study followed Henry and 
Mark’s framework item by item.  Though the researcher did 
not expect to find examples of every one of Henry and 
Mark’s categories of influence –- they themselves portray 
the framework as a ‘menu’ from which to choose rather than 
as a definitive model – she included every one of their 
categories in the initial coding scheme.  She used a simple 
spreadsheet to organize the data. After coding the 
interview data, the researcher matched the examples of 
influence with evaluation report recommendations.  This 
offered both a sense of how much time passed before the 
influence took place, and gave a sense of whether the 
influence of the evaluation was intentional or not 
intentional.   
Individual Level 
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 The individual level of influence, for Henry and Mark, 
represents a change in an individual’s beliefs or behavior 
as a result of having participated in an evaluation or read 
an evaluation report.  Inclusion in this category does not 
preclude an appearance in the interpersonal or collective 
categories; rather, it is a designation for cases where 
that is principally the appropriate description.  The 
following examples were of individual-level forms of 
evaluation influence for the CARE interview data. 
Attitude Change  
 
The evaluations of CARE’s response in Haiti to 
Tropical Storm Jeanne yielded an attitude change in CARE 
personnel who were involved in the response.  The country 
director at the time for Haiti observed this, remarking 
that when people were in the throes of the emergency 
response, it was a lot easier to see where CARE’s efforts 
fell short of addressing the overwhelming need.  The 
evaluations, both the After Action Review and the Final 
Evaluation, shifted people’s attitudes, helping them to see 
that they had done some good work and made a positive 
difference.  The country director’s identification of this 
instance of evaluation influence is difficult to 
corroborate with the evaluation reports from the After 
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Action Review and the Final Evaluation, as neither report 
explicitly states an intent to help workers feel better 
about their work.  But another interviewee, speaking about 
a different intervention, commented also that it is far 
easier to make a list of things gone wrong, and that her 
impression is that evaluation has the power to help people 
to see what they have done well.   
Behavior Change 
 The evaluation of the CARE India response to the 
Gujarat earthquake of 2001 yielded traceable behavior 
change in CARE India’s emergency procedures.  The 
recommendations and lessons-learned (the heading for that 
evaluation report was “major lessons-learned and 
recommendations”) included a call for CARE India and CARE 
International both to create operating procedures for 
disaster response and to take steps to beef up disaster 
preparedness capacity in general.  An interviewee from CARE 
India asserted that the call for better preparedness 
resulted in trained community task forces for preparedness 
at the village level, as well as a regular spot for 
preparedness at annual planning meetings from that point 
forward.  The test for CARE India’s improved preparedness 
came three years later with the tsunami response.  The 
evaluation for the tsunami response found that CARE India 
114 
 
was prepared and had a rapid response with timely staff 
deployment.   
 The 2001 earthquake evaluation also criticized 
procurement for not being effective enough at purchasing 
and transporting needed materials.  An interviewee said 
that the evaluation process brought the procurement 
shortcomings to CARE India’s attention, and that CARE India 
had responded to that in two concrete ways. The first was 
to have vendors identified in several locations, making 
distance and time less of an issue.  The second was to 
designate the individual in charge of the emergency as the 
procurement authority.  The 2005 evaluation of the tsunami 
response in India specifically named the pre-identified 
vendors as a strength in the procurement aspect of the 
tsunami response.  This change occurred at the individual 
level – one interviewee described how he had changed his 
practice as a direct result of participating in the 
earthquake evaluation.  The change also occurred at an 
institutional level, and Henry and Mark’s framework does 
not offer an obvious mechanism to identify this phenomenon.  
This is partly due to the complexity of sorting out the 
dynamics and lines of authority in transnational 
confederations such as CARE.  While the individual, 
interpersonal, and collective levels certainly ring true 
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for designations that represent CARE, there are country- 
and regional- office-level relationships that need also to 
be considered in where evaluation influence occurs. 
 The 2-day After Action Review response to the 2005 
Niger food crisis also yielded behavioral change for CARE.  
The evaluation report recommended training for accountants.  
An interviewee from CARE Niger said that that evaluation 
report helped them to create a standard – they now 
stipulate that an accountant working with them must be 
competent in Microsoft Excel.  
 The Multi-agency evaluation of the response to the 
2005 Niger food crisis also led to a behavioral change, 
according to a CARE Niger interviewee.  The report 
discussed the need for better staff training for emergency 
preparedness.  Now, CARE Niger both prepares staff for the 
possibility of an emergency and recruits supplementary 
staff in advance of future emergencies.  
Interpersonal Level 
 
 No specific instances of the interpersonal level as 
the primary level of influence emerged from this set of 
interview data. This is not to say that the interpersonal 
level is not relevant to the patterns of evaluation 
influence exhibited at CARE. A few of the interviewees 
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alluded to interpersonal dynamics; in particular, three 
interviewees mentioned their perception that individuals 
sometimes act as change agents, championing an evaluation 
recommendation when it strikes a chord with them.  The 
implication from the interviews was that this form of 
influence is episodic and hard to anticipate.  None of the 
interviews yielded a concrete example of this form of 
influence, so it is not included in the discussion about 
pathways below.  However, as is the case with any such data 
set, a different sample of interviewees might well have 
resulted in the emergence of instances of interpersonal 
influence.  It appears to be potentially a relevant level 
of influence for the humanitarian aid INGO. 
 
Collective Level 
The collective level proved challenging for 
determining where and how influence occurred. CARE is 
complex in that it is not strictly hierarchical and it has 
country, regional, and international-level relationships 
within the organization, as well as a community of peers.  
The collective level of influence did not seem to fit any 
of these relationships neatly.  For the purposes of the 
study, the researcher interpreted “collective” to mean 
CARE-wide, meaning CARE International and relationships 
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between the 12 CARE International members.  The researcher 
creates an intra-organizational category to capture the 
layer of influence occurring more broadly than at the 
individual and interpersonal level but not as extensively 
as at the collective level.  
Agenda Setting 
 
 In the interview data, there was one example of agenda 
-setting brought about by an evaluation.  In Haiti, where 
both an After Action Review and a Final Evaluation took 
place, the country director affirmed that she incorporated 
lessons-learned from those evaluation reports (finalized in 
March 2005) into the agenda for a June annual preparedness 
planning session.  She cited a streamlined potable-water 
distribution plan as an action resulting from that 
evaluation-influenced agenda. 
 Three other interviewees had the impression that 
evaluation findings feed into annual and strategic 
sessions, but could not offer a specific example.  Two of 
those three voiced the opinion that evaluation 
recommendations become agenda items when they happen to 
resonate with an individual involved in the process; that 
is, evaluation results are by no means systematically 
included in planning agendas.   
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 The above examples show that when we view the CARE 
case through the lens of the Henry and Mark framework, the 
few instances of evaluation influence occur mostly at the 
individual level, with the exception of some agenda-setting 
on a broader level.  The interpersonal level did not 
surface from the interview data. This could be in part due 
to the limitations of the interview protocol; the questions 
highlighted individual and CARE-wide experiences more than 
it did the interpersonal.  Also, the category itself is 
nebulous when considering the complex CARE organization.  
Though interpersonal dynamics certainly exist at the level 
of any given individual office, the category gets murky 
when considering relating with colleagues overseas, 
colleagues communicating between developing and 
industrialized nations, and colleagues between main member 
organizations connected to the secretariat. 
 Henry and Mark’s framework turns out to be a good tool 
for the sorting of interview data and evaluation report 
data.  Each of the instances of influence found a home in 
their sub-categories, notably in the attitude change, 
behavior change, and agenda-setting categories.  The levels 
of influence also fit the data. However, a CARE-specific 
theory of evaluation influence would include another level 
of influence not represented in the Henry and Mark 
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framework.  Large INGOs like CARE often have regional and 
country-level decision-making centers in addition to the 
main governing body.  In the case of a confederation like 
CARE, the nexus of the decision-making power does not 
reside solely with the CARE International secretariat.  The 
regional management units have much of the coordinating 
role in the event of an emergency response.  For this 
reason, the collective level proved a difficult designation 
to assign to the interview and evaluation report data for 
CARE.  There were different levels of collective influence 
that did not fit neatly into the framework.  A CARE-
specific theory of influence includes a fourth inter-
organizational level of influence with the same sub-
categories as the collective level, which applies to CARE-
wide or inter-INGO examples of evaluation influence.  The 
inter-organizational level is for instances of influence 
primarily occurring at the country office or regional 
office level.  It is distinctly a different level from a 
CARE-wide level of agenda-setting or policy change.   
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Figure 2: Four Levels of Influence for Large INGOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The Henry and Mark framework includes policy-oriented 
learning, policy change, and diffusion as potential 
mechanisms for collective-level influence.  None of these 
three mechanisms emerged from the interview data as 
characteristic of evaluation influence at CARE.  This could 
be in part because the mechanisms are more suited to 
looking at policies than to looking at programs.  
Certainly, the limited time frame for the study (2000-2005) 
may have precluded the observance of policy change and 
diffusion, which take time to manifest.  Finally, it is 
LEVELS OF INFLUENCE 
Individual Interpersonal
  
Intra- 
organizational 
Collective 
Attitude 
Change 
 
Salience 
Elaboration 
Priming 
Skill 
Acquisition 
Behavioral 
Change 
Justification 
 
Persuasion 
Change Agent 
Social Norms 
Minority-
Opinion 
Influence 
Agenda 
Setting 
 
Policy 
Oriented 
Learning 
Policy Change 
Diffusion 
Agenda 
Setting 
 
Policy 
Oriented 
Learning 
Policy Change 
Diffusion 
121 
 
likely that the evaluation findings themselves fall short 
of reaching policy-level decision-makers.  
The intra-organizational level 
 
 The researcher proposes an intra-organizational level 
for a better understanding of the influence dynamics in a 
complex transnational organization.  The intra-
organizational level of influence mirrors the collective 
level, because it primarily concerned with policy-level 
learning and change, but learning and policies are country- 
or regional- office wide rather than occurring throughout 
and beyond CARE as a whole.  It is distinct from the 
interpersonal level because the country and regional 
offices have their own sets of policies and procedures that 
are sometimes necessarily region-specific.  Different 
regions have different risk situations; natural resource-
poor Haiti, for instance, is chronically plagued with 
weather and water problems, whereas parts of Africa 
struggle more with conflict-related emergencies than with 
natural disasters. Other areas experience emergencies 
without being constantly disaster-prone.   
 The Agenda Setting category for the Intra-
organizational level involves inclusion of evaluation 
findings in preparedness or annual planning events.  The 
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designation applies also to brainstorming or knowledge-
sharing events within CARE, such as the annual Crosswalk 
meeting. It differs from the collective level of agenda-
setting, which occurs with the executive team level or 
among the peer group of NGOs of which CARE is a part. 
 The Policy Oriented Learning category for the Intra-
organizational level is about absorption of lessons-learned 
at the country or regional office level. This manifests 
itself, for example, in future terms of reference for 
emergency evaluations that reflect lessons-learned emerging 
from past emergency evaluations.   
 The Policy Change category for the Intra-
organizational level aims at regional- or country- level 
policy.  An example of this is the decision in CARE India 
following the 2001 earthquake evaluation to delegate 
procurement decision-making authority to the individual 
directly handling the emergency (rather than by default to 
the country director, or someone else).  Diffusion at the 
Intra-organizational level differs from the Collective 
level in that the idea diffuses from country to country or 
country to region, rather than from country to CARE as a 
whole or from CARE to other INGOs.   
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Pathways of Influence 
 
 Henry and Mark maintain that the categories in their 
framework are not mutually exclusive and, in fact, can be 
integrally related as links in a causal chain.  They 
present the framework as an instrument for tracing the 
‘pathways’ of influence, for putting together the links in 
the chain that lead from an evaluation’s initial form of 
influence to an evolved form.   Identifying these pathways 
then helps organizations to understand the nuanced ways in 
which evaluations influence them on multiple levels, and 
also helps them to plan for effective future evaluations.   
 Because CARE’s structure is that of a confederation 
rather than strictly a hierarchy, the pathways of influence 
resemble a ripple effect of droplets in a pool of water.  
The few identifiable pathways of influence emerging from 
this data are not identical, which suggests that 
evaluations in CARE are not conducted within a cemented 
institutional culture of learning.  Moreover, it is 
possible that a different set of 25 interviewees would have 
identified pathways of influence with a slightly different 
pattern.  So the pattern in CARE’s pathways of influence is 
that influence occurs episodically, as a particular issue 
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resonates with an individual, rather than predictably and 
systematically.   
 An example of this is the evaluation of CARE’s 
response to Tropical Storm Jeanne in Haiti, which involved 
both an After Action Review and a full Final Evaluation.   
↓ The After Action Review yielded a sense among the 
permanent and deployed staff of having done several 
things well in the emergency response, whereas in the 
midst of a crisis that was devastating to CARE Haiti 
staff and families as well as to Haiti as a whole, it 
was much easier to see where the intervention fell 
short.   
↓ The bolstered morale from the After Action Review then 
set the stage for the Final Evaluation conducted two 
months later.  CARE staff were willing participants in 
a process that they might easily have regarded with 
apprehension.   
↓ The Final Evaluation, written in English and then 
translated into French, was distributed beyond CARE to 
the other INGOs involved locally in the intervention.  
The staff of CARE Haiti also received the findings 
from the evaluation.   
↓ The recommendations from the final report served as 
material for the preparedness planning effort in June 
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of that year, as well as a couple of months later for 
the annual planning event.  
↓ One resulting action was the streamlining of the 
storage and distribution system for potable water for 
future emergencies in Haiti. 
This chain of events shows that the evaluation 
influenced the organization in both subtle and noticeable 
ways.  An interviewee had sensed an initial reluctance on 
the part of some staff who were to participate in the After 
Action Review, a reluctance she attributed to fatigue from 
months of work in a daunting and depressing situation.  The 
staff may not have participated in the exercise because 
they anticipated a morale boost, but after having 
participated, they had a better picture of what they had 
done well in the emergency response.  This example of one 
evaluation’s influence may not have been intentional.  CARE 
Haiti’s changing the practice for storing and distributing 
water, in contrast, followed an intended recommendation of 
the evaluation report, and is an example of direct and 
instrumental use of the evaluation. 
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Figure 3: Pathway of influence for Tropical Storm Jeanne 
 
 Another chain of events, from the evaluation of CARE’s 
response to the Gujarat earthquake in India in 2001, bears 
some similarity to the pathway for the Haiti evaluation 
influence in that there was a similar mix of intended and 
unintended instances of influence, as well as direct, 
instrumental forms of influence alongside more subtle 
examples.  The evaluation took place; the process of 
evaluating and the findings themselves brought 
preparedness, procurement and delegation of authority to 
evaluation participants’ attention as areas in need of 
improvement. CARE India took action on all three of these 
themes, resulting in a more positive review of these 
127 
 
aspects of emergency response in a later evaluation of a 
different emergency. 
 
Figure 4: Pathways of Influence for India Earthquake 
Evaluation 
 
 Looking at how the pathways of influence shape up 
instead of merely identifying the types of influence offers 
insight into how the design, the timing, or the 
implementation of the evaluation affect how the evaluation 
influences the organization.  These give the organization 
an idea of where to start in meta-evaluating how their 
evaluations influence.  Identifying these pathways will 
enable the organization to design ways of verifying the 
impact of the evaluation.   
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 This study initially tried to use Kirkhart’s (2000) 
Integrated Theory of Evaluation Influence to explain the 
patterns of influence at CARE.  Kirkhart’s theory, while it 
did not codify adequately enough to be useful for such an 
application, does make a compelling case for the idea of 
influence versus evaluation use and her matrix of 
dimensions of influence serve as a launching point for 
discussion about influence in a particular case, if it is 
not particularly suited for adapting to individual 
contexts.   Kirkhart, who, like Henry and Mark, espouses 
the more inclusive term ‘influence’ rather than ‘use’ to 
describe the effect of an evaluation on a policy or 
program, proposes three ‘dimensions’ of influence for 
looking at evaluations.  The intention dimension considers 
whether the instance of influence was or was not an 
intended result of the evaluation process or the evaluation 
report. Her source of influence dimension looks at whether 
the instance of influence stems from the process of 
evaluating, or from the results of the evaluation.  Her 
third and final dimension, time, offers three periods of 
timing during which influence might have more or less 
opportunity: immediate, end-of-cycle, and long-term.  All 
of Kirkhart’s dimensions are relevant to the data at hand; 
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the time dimension is the most difficult to observe in the 
CARE data.   
This observation challenge is in large part due to the 
short span of time (2000-2005) over which the researcher 
studied evaluations.  (This choice had mostly to do with 
availability and accessibility of reports prior to 2000).  
Furthermore, several of the evaluation reports studied were 
of CARE’s response to the 2004 Asian tsunami in several 
countries, where in some cases there was no precedent of 
CARE’s having operated there prior to the tsunami.  So not 
only had relatively little time passed from 2000-2005, the 
period of study, but just one country in the study had an 
emergency after having evaluated a prior emergency.  
Comparing the evaluations of the Gujarat earthquake 
response (2001) and the Indian tsunami response (2005) did 
reveal longer-term effects of the first evaluation that 
might not have been observable a couple of years prior.   
Comparing the two India evaluations over time also 
highlighted another aspect of evaluation influence: the 
areas where the evaluation process and findings did not 
influence the organization as intended.  The evaluation 
report for the Gujarat earthquake response included a 
recommendation to consult with beneficiaries in designing 
the emergency response, so as to meet their needs 
130 
 
adequately.  The later evaluation also recommended 
consulting the local community on its needs and wishes, 
suggesting that that recommendation was not, in fact, a 
“lesson learned.”  It is beyond the scope of this study to 
delve into why some lessons go unlearned and others end up 
as agenda items for planning purposes, but discovering an 
instance of a lesson unlearned alongside two lessons 
learned from the same evaluation shows that the absent 
examples of evaluation influence can be just as instructive 
for an organization.  The idea of looking at where lessons 
went unlearned, which could even be the result of negative 
influence, merits further study. 
 The following table summarizes the instances of 
influence identified through the interview data.  At first 
glance, the table looks sparse. This is because many of the 
interviewees perceived areas of influence that the 
interviewer could not verify. Only those instances 
verifiable through multiple interviews or through 
corroboration with evaluation reports are recorded in the 
table.  Also, there are just three evaluations represented 
in the table. Many of the evaluations reviewed for the 
study, most notably those from the 2004 Asian tsunami, do 
not show up in the table because at the time the study was 
conducted, so little time had elapsed between the 
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evaluations and the interviews that it was not possible to 
verify any perceived examples of influence.  The arrows in 
the table indicate where instances of influence link to 
become pathways. 
TABLE 2. Instances of Influence  
 
LEVELS OF INFLUENCE Tropical 
Storm 
Jeanne 
India 
Earthquake 
Niger Food 
Crisis 
INDIVIDUAL     
Attitude Change X   
Salience    
Elaboration    
Priming    
Skill Acquisition  X  
Behavioral Change X X X 
INTERPERSONAL     
Justification    
Persuasion    
Change Agent    
Social Norms    
Minority-Opinion 
Influence 
   
INTRAORGANIZATION
AL 
    
Agenda Setting X X X 
Policy Oriented 
Learning 
   
Policy Change X X  
Diffusion    
COLLECTIVE     
Agenda Setting    
Policy Oriented 
Learning 
   
Policy Change    
Diffusion    
 
CARE’s Evaluation Influence ‘Story’ 
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The two pathways of influence proposed above show two 
distinctly different routes from the evaluation to the 
changes brought about through influence.  This is a useful 
distinction because they are two different cases of 
different kinds of emergencies, yet they tell a similar 
story of how influence happens within CARE.  Both cases 
included both an After Action Review, which is by nature a 
highly participatory exercise involving individual 
reflection and interpersonal dialogue, and a Final 
Evaluation.  The same is true for a third example, CARE’s 
response to the famine in Niger.  For all three examples, 
Haiti, India, and Niger, the person(s) responsible for 
getting lessons-learned on the planning agenda for going 
forward had participated in (or led, in one case) the After 
Action Review, and were involved at least as interviewees 
in the Final Evaluation.  This may in part explain why the 
influence reaches the intra-organizational level, but 
consistently falls short of effecting change at the 
collective organizational level or of diffusing to peer or 
partner INGOs: those responsible for setting the agenda at 
the collective organizational level are removed from the 
front lines of the process of evaluation and have only 
lengthy reports from which to sort through possible 
priorities. The lessons consequently go unlearned. 
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It surprises no one that this study finds many more 
examples of lessons unlearned than of lessons learned.  
There are dozens of possible reasons for this.  The lessons 
learned, however, are examples of intended, direct, 
instrumental influence flanked by unintended and indirect 
influences.  These examples lend themselves to a sort of 
theory of influence specific to CARE (and possibly other 
similar INGOs) in the emergency response context, a theory 
of influence that can function as a tool for facilitating 
evaluation influence at the planning stage of the 
evaluation.   
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 This study shows that the consequence of evaluation 
reports goes beyond use to encompass influence, which 
includes both direct, intended evaluation results and 
indirect, unintended effects.  In the case reviewed for 
this study, evaluation reports were not merely window-
dressing; in addition to upholding accountability, they 
affected individual attitude and behavior, relationships, 
and country- and regional- level change.  The factors 
leading to these changes, in large part the format and 
timing of the evaluations, can inform future evaluations so 
that they will have greater positive influence. 
So What? 
 The 1990s brought more media attention to INGOs and 
their work than ever before.  Well-publicized scandals in 
the disaster relief community at the time heightened both 
the public’s concern and that of donors over INGOs’ 
responsible use of donated funds in responding to 
emergencies.  Non-governmental organizations are 
experiencing a call to action to institute or improve on 
their existing systems of accountability.  This has 
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resulted in a rise in evaluative activity on the part of 
humanitarian aid organizations. 
 But the question remains as to whether this newfound 
energy and effort toward greater and more rigorous 
accountability results in better or more responsible work 
and use of funding on the part of these INGOs. Evaluations 
cost time and money at the very least, two resources which 
are by definition scarce for an INGO. Any dollar wasted on 
an ineffective evaluation is a dollar that might have gone 
toward emergency relief supplies. So it is important to ask 
whether evaluations do improve INGOs’ practice (and thereby 
by extension help them to fulfill their mission and make 
the world a better place).   
 It is not hard to believe that there were far more 
cases of lessons not learned in the evaluations reviewed in 
this study than of lessons learned, that is to say 
recommendations that resulted in action and subsequent 
improvement.  At first glance, it seems rational to expect 
that a chain of actions would look something like this: a) 
CARE commissions an evaluation of its response to a 
particular emergency b) a team of evaluators conducts the 
evaluation c) the evaluation team produces a report that 
includes recommendations for how to improve on current 
practice d) personnel diligently read the disseminated 
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report and do their part to make sure that the 
recommendations are carried out.  Of course it does not 
work quite like this. If it did, there would be no body of 
literature spanning three decades on evaluation 
utilization. 
 The literature on whether and how evaluation findings 
are used has evolved to consider a range of ways that 
evaluation might affect an organization and its operating 
environment. This sort of consequence, or ‘influence,’ 
looks past evaluation use to how evaluation might affect 
even the broad policy climate.  As the CARE case also 
shows, the evaluation influence does not have to be direct 
or intentional to have a positive and worthwhile impact on 
an organization.  
 As accountability gains prominence as an area of 
importance for INGOs, the question of whether and how the 
evaluations that make up the backbone of the accountability 
system influence the INGO and its operating environment 
looms large.  In emergency response, improving one’s 
practice can have such grand effect as saving a life.  It 
is also important to consider whether evaluations influence 
the organization in smaller, subtler ways, even if the bulk 
of the lessons appear to go unlearned.  This study has used 
Henry and Mark’s framework for evaluation influence to look 
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at the case of CARE, a prominent INGO in the area of 
emergency response.    
Limitations of the Study 
Most, though not all, of the interviews conducted for 
this study were with employees of CARE USA.  Though this is 
in part a function of CARE USA’s comparatively significant 
size and role in emergency response, it is important to 
acknowledge here that the research findings represent CARE 
USA more accurately or more thoroughly than they do some of 
the smaller CARE members.  Also, although all of the 
evaluations conducted between 2000 and 2005 were reviewed 
for this study, it is important to consider that a 
disproportionate number of them were from CARE’s response 
to the Asian tsunami of 2004.  
As with any qualitative research, there is a level of 
subjectivity to this study, particularly in its heavy 
reliance on interviews that capture individuals’ 
perceptions.  A single person conducted the interviews and 
culled the evaluation reports, leaving room for the 
possibility of a one-sided interpretation of the interview 
and report data.   Also, selection of interviewees relied 
on 6 people’s informed opinions about who would comprise a 
representation of those at different levels of the 
evaluation process.  The researcher conducted five pre-
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interview interviews as a way of refining which questions 
to ask and ascertaining whom to interview.  CARE’s 
Coordinator for Quality, Accountability, and Standards then 
helped the researcher to make the final selection of whom 
to interview.  Though the selection of interviewees was 
careful and thoughtful, 25 other interviewees might have 
painted a different picture of how evaluation works at 
CARE. 
Discussion on the Findings 
 Henry and Mark’s framework for tracing evaluation 
influence showed itself to be a useful tool for developing 
a context-specific taxonomy that represents how and on what 
levels evaluations affect people, places and policies.  In 
the case of CARE, “context-specific” meant adding an Intra-
organizational level of influence.  This helped to 
distinguish between examples of influence that are 
collective at a country or regional level from examples 
that are collective at an organization-wide or peer group-
wide level.  The subcategories for the Intra-organizational 
level mirror those for the Collective level. 
 Using this modified framework to sort the interview 
responses and compare them to the evaluation reports 
yielded a picture of how evaluation influence comes about 
in CARE’s emergency response unit.  There were three 
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examples of direct, instrumental evaluation use at the 
country and regional level:  
o The evaluations of CARE Haiti’s response to Tropical 
Storm Jeanne yielded an eventual streamlining of CARE 
Haiti’s potable water storage and distribution system. 
 
o The evaluations of CARE India’s response to the 
Gujarat earthquake resulted in the delegating of 
authority for procurement decisions for future 
emergencies, as well as an established list of 
identified local vendors of disaster relief materials. 
 
 
o The evaluations of CARE India’s response to the 
Gujarat earthquake prompted CARE India to develop a 
concrete disaster preparedness plan. 
 
There were also examples of more modest, not-necessarily-
intended use:  
o The After Action Review for CARE Haiti and Tropical 
Storm Jeanne reassured emergency staff that they were 
doing good work and making a difference. This set the 
stage for the final evaluation two months later. 
 
o The Tropical Storm Jeanne evaluations became the 
basis for the agenda of a preparedness-planning 
meeting three months later, and an annual planning 
meeting two months after that.  
 
It is easy to point to numerous recommendations from the 
evaluations in the study as lessons un-learned, or 
recommendations for which there is no evidence of resulting 
change.  Of course, some of these are cases of countries 
where there has not yet been another emergency to show 
where the emergency response has improved due to 
recommendations from evaluations of prior emergencies. Some 
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are also cases where a different sample of interviewees 
might have had different experiences of evaluation, 
resulting in a different set of examples of lessons learned 
and unlearned.   
There is one emergency setting for which two 
evaluations, one from an earlier (2001) emergency and one 
from a later (2004) emergency, show that some lessons were 
learned whereas others were not. Paralleling the Gujarat 
earthquake evaluation findings with the tsunami India 
evaluation findings suggests that though there were a 
couple of areas (mentioned above)where the 2004 response 
effort improved from the 2001 response, there was an area 
where the lesson remained unlearned: both evaluations 
concluded that it is essential to consult with the 
beneficiary community about the response plan before going 
ahead with the emergency response, and both recommended 
that this be implemented in the future.   
Other examples of evaluation influence not occurring 
or not occurring systematically emerged from the interview 
data.  Two interviewees who are country directors said that 
evaluation findings are sometimes considered in annual 
planning events, but not systematically.  Both speculated 
that some evaluation recommendations find their way onto 
annual planning agendas if they happen to resonate with an 
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individual who champions them.  A member of CARE’s Impact 
Measurement and Learning team echoed this opinion.  
 Another example of missed opportunity for evaluation 
influence lies in personnel participation in evaluations.  
Three interviewees who had task-related jobs (rather than 
country director or other managerial positions) expressed 
the desire to be asked to participate in After Action 
Reviews or asked to give interviews for Final Evaluations.  
The interviewees lamented the lost opportunity to reflect 
or to offer an opinion about the emergency response.   
Pathways of Influence 
 Mapping out the instances of influence into patterns 
of chains of influence shows in the case of CARE that 
evaluations have greater and farther reaching influence 
than might seem on the surface to be the case.  When asked 
directly about whether “lessons-learned” are actually 
learned, most of the interviewees admitted to seldom if 
ever reading the evaluation reports and expressed 
skepticism concerning whether lessons actually get learned.  
One person went so far as to say that in an emergency, 
planning happens immediately and speedily, and no one is 
going to reach back to the recommendations from a previous 
evaluation for insight in such a moment of urgency.  The 
pathways of influence illuminated in this CARE case show 
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that the evaluations may have a greater effect, sometimes 
in subtle ways, than the interviewees think that they do.   
 Both of the pathways of influence traceable in this 
CARE case show the process part of the evaluation to be 
important to its overall influence.  Involvement in the 
process of evaluating created “buy-in” and made key people 
sit up and take notice of necessary and doable changes that 
could be made.  The After Action Review offered a place to 
reflect and gave deployed personnel a forum for discussing 
their experiences.  In the cases of Haiti/Tropical Storm 
Jeanne and India/tsunami response, the After Action Review 
set the stage for successful Final Evaluation activities by 
creating good will on the part of personnel for 
participating in the evaluation activity.  Thus, though a 
substantial number of evaluation recommendations do not 
become action items, the evaluation process, particularly 
in the case of After Action Reviews followed by Final 
Evaluations, have much value in that they can boost 
participants’ morale in the midst of a depressing disaster 
scene.  Participating in an evaluation can motivate a 
person to pay attention to the evaluation findings. 
Lessons (Un)Learned 
 Identifying the pathways of influence sheds some light 
on why some evaluation lessons-learned receive attention 
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and others do not.  As an illustration, the case of the 
Haiti Tropical Storm Jeanne evaluations culminating in a 
change in procedure for handling potable water was an 
example of a recommendation for better preparedness that 
was easy to execute. Furthermore, the preparedness planning 
meeting coincided with the availability and dissemination 
of the evaluation recommendations.  The ascertaining of 
procurement vendors in India followed much the same 
pattern.  Lessons are learned when the timing of the 
evaluations and evaluation reports is good (coincides with 
planning meetings without interfering with the emergency 
response itself), when the evaluators are well-received or 
well-regarded, or when one particular lesson resonates with 
an individual who makes an extra effort to see the 
recommendation carried through. 
Lessons that go unlearned, however, do so for myriad 
reasons. Five of the interviewees mentioned, for example, 
the absence of a ‘culture of learning’ or ‘culture of 
accountability’ at CARE as a culprit for not capturing 
lessons-learned, and two more interviewees called it a lack 
of ‘institutional memory.’ It is probably unfair to say 
that CARE lacks entirely a culture of learning. After all, 
CARE USA has a team of four persons whose function is to 
strengthen CARE’s accountability to itself and others 
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through inquiry and learning.  It may be that evaluations 
are not fully realized as tools within the learning 
structure.  But it would appear that evaluation of 
emergency response is very slowly integrating into the 
culture at CARE as a means of reflecting on past practice 
and improving on future practice: 
o Part of the decision to look at the 2000-2005 
evaluations for this study rather than start farther 
back than 2000 is that it is only in the year 2000 
that there are consistent records and evaluation 
reports for each emergency response in CARE’s 
repository.   
o CARE International adopted a carefully conceived set 
of evaluation standards in 2005 that inform the design 
and execution of all evaluations of policies or 
programs. 
o By 2005, After Action Reviews accompany all of CARE’s 
evaluations of emergency response activities, 
suggesting that giving deployed personnel a forum for 
reflection and helping them to identify the positives 
in the impact they have had is a shifting priority for 
CARE.   
o The 2004 Asian tsunami and the 2005 Niger food crisis 
were events for which CARE participated in a multi-
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agency evaluation, suggesting a comfort level in 
sharing evaluation findings with peers.   
An emergency can be a grisly, depressing scene. When 
the needs of the afflicted are as basic as water and 
shelter, a person’s instinct might be to put a response 
plan in place as rapidly as possible so as to begin to 
mitigate the suffering.  To paraphrase one interviewee’s 
sentiments, “you’re not going to go poring back through 
evaluations of former emergencies for lessons-learned 
before at a time like that.” Another interviewee pointed 
out that some evaluation recommendations are easier to 
carry out than others are in an emergency situation. The 
interviewee suggested that sometimes it is a matter of 
capacity – it is not that CARE is ignoring a 
recommendation, but that it does not have the capacity to 
respond to it fully.  He pointed out that for the majority 
of staff deployed in an emergency, emergency response is 
one sliver of their job – most are not devoted to 
emergencies full-time.  This is the excuse many 
interviewees gave for not reading lengthy evaluation 
reports; emergencies are but one small portion of their 
jobs.   
CARE’s Evaluation Influence vis-à-vis Its Peers  
 
146 
 
Though it is not a main aim of this research to 
compare evaluation influence between two or more INGOs in 
depth, it is important to consider CARE in the setting of 
its INGO peers.  This is essential because emergency 
response frequently is a team effort drawing simultaneously 
from the strengths of each INGO.  The effectiveness of the 
emergency response is greater than the sum of the parts – 
the individual INGOs – that participated.  This is clear 
from the Multi-Agency Evaluations reviewed for this study; 
the agencies participating in the evaluations each had 
strengths that contributed to the response in ways that the 
other INGOs could not on their own.  Determining how to 
increase the influence of evaluations in CARE not only has 
implications for similarly large, decentralized 
transnational organizations, it means more useful 
evaluation reports for CARE’s peers and partners in 
emergency response.  The Asian tsunami of 2004 brought with 
it a great deal of collaboration among INGOs because the 
damage wrought was so severe as to require INGO assistance 
on a massive scale.  Some of the humanitarian aid agencies 
collaborated on jointly evaluating their response efforts 
for the tsunami and for the 2005 food crisis in Niger.  It 
is difficult to compare the respective findings for each 
agency, as each had a distinct role based on its strengths 
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and resources in the emergency response.  But it is 
significant of a shift in culture that the agencies found 
value not only in evaluating their respective activities, 
but in evaluating the inter-agency collaboration with the 
hope of improving on it.  Time will tell how these 
evaluations influence that collaboration. 
Though the other agencies4 involved in the Multi-Agency 
Evaluations have a confederation structure like CARE (most 
have a more traditional hierarchical structure), the 
framework developed in this study and the ensuing theory 
for how pathways of influence work in the CARE setting are 
likely to be applicable for these other major players in 
the emergency response arena because they face similar 
challenges of different levels of management, from the 
front lines to the country and regional level to the 
executive and policy level.  All of these agencies work in 
development as well as in humanitarian relief, and all of 
them have been prominent figures in recent emergency 
situations.  How they compare in terms of evaluation 
influence within and beyond the agency is beyond the scope 
of this study. However, an Overseas Development Institute 
                                                   
4 World Vision International, Oxfam Great Britain. Catholic 
Relief Services, Save the Children, International Rescue 
Committee, and Mercy Corps 
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(ODI) report (2005)5 found that evaluation is a particular 
area of strength for CARE, though there is not a systematic 
way to integrate lessons-learned into policy formation for 
the organization. 
CARE-Specific Recommendations 
A couple of interviewees expressed a wish that they 
could participate in evaluations from other countries and 
regions within CARE’s system so as to learn from their 
successes and failures.  Breaking down barriers in 
encouraging a dialogue of ideas and experience will promote 
a learning culture (Garvin 2000).  This sort of exchange 
can be instituted into the regular evaluation cycle. 
The interviews highlight a particular strength within 
CARE: employees really do care about doing their jobs well 
and are willing to work hard at that in the most adverse of 
circumstances.  When lessons go unlearned, it is not so 
much a problem of indifference as it is of attitudes, time 
                                                   
5 The report, commissioned by the CARE International 
Secretariat, addressed CARE’s perception that its emergency 
response needed to be assessed and improved upon.  The 
report compared CARE to World Vision, Oxfam, Médecins Sans 
Frontières (MSF), the International Rescue Committee (IRC), 
Save the Children, and the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Society across four benchmarks: timeless of 
emergency response, appropriateness of response, 
proportionality (in scale) of the response, and 
effectiveness  in achieving objectives.  The review found 
that CARE has not grown as its peers have grown in terms of 
its capacity to respond to emergencies.   
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availability, and confusion over whose responsibility it is 
to assure that change occurs.  The following are 
recommendations for building a stronger culture for lesson-
learning, where evaluations could be engineered to have 
greater influence: 
1. Standardized Template for evaluations. The evaluation 
reports reviewed are not uniform in terms of form, content 
and methodology, although the more recent evaluations are 
beginning to resemble each other.  A more standardized 
format would be helpful for those looking to skim the 
report rapidly.  It would help evaluators in ensuring that 
their outputs were in line with CARE’s expectations.   
Fields on the format could be linked to a searchable 
database to allow easy access to lessons learned in a 
concise format, either from individual evaluations or in 
the form of a synthesis (e.g. a summary of recommendations 
relating to human resources over the past two years). 
How: The recommendation is for a standardized Terms of 
Reference and evaluation format that would include:  
o qualifications of the evaluator including whether 
he/she has ever worked for CARE and/or “knows” CARE,  
o methods used to conduct the evaluation,   
o minimum baseline data collection,  
o evaluation findings for a list of subcategories,  
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o findings and recommendations. This last category 
would have a clear distinction made between a “lesson 
learned” and a “recommendation,” with a section for 
“good practices,” or positive lessons-learned that 
ought to be replicated.    
 
2. Template or guideline for AARs:  The After Action 
Reviews were perceived positively by most of the 
interviewees as a means of identifying lessons-learned 
through evaluative reflection.  A thorough how-to for 
conducting one, or at least reporting on one, would 
facilitate the use of AAR findings.   
 
How:  The AAR should take place early enough that those who 
responded to the emergency are still there, but late enough 
that the AAR does not interfere with the response effort.  
The review should consist of reflection both on the process 
of the response and on the end result.  In addition to the 
individuals directly involved in the response, 
representatives from human resources, procurement, 
logistics, security, and external relations should be 
invited to participate.  Each attendee should receive at 
least a summary of the AAR notes and recommendations.  The 
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facilitator should be competent in the relevant language 
for the AAR. 
 
3. Yearly synthesis of priority themes to coincide with 
planning cycle of CARE: It is clear from the interviews 
conducted for this study that CARE employees, like those of 
most nonprofit organizations, are time-starved from the 
operational level all the way up to senior management.  
Moreover, the lengthiness of the evaluation reports 
dissuades people from reading them and from wading through 
text to identify recommendations relevant to the 
individual’s job.  An annual synthesis of important themes 
and identification of themes on which to focus for the year 
would assist in shaping CARE’s policy and planning agenda.  
Several of the individuals interviewed envisioned this 
yearly synthesis as coinciding with the end of the calendar 
year in December, in anticipation of January planning 
sessions for the following fiscal year.  Others saw the 
Annual Operating Plan meetings as the forum for such a 
synthesis.   This synthesis, with follow-up from previous 
syntheses, would be appropriate at bi-annual ERWG meetings, 
as well.   
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How: the person responsible for quality assurance within 
CARE’s emergency group would lead a synthesis exercise in 
November and December of each year.  (It is important that 
the person leading the exercise be thoroughly familiar with 
the responses reviewed, and that the person be high enough 
within CARE to assure buy-in from all concerned. 
Significantly, the main researcher for this study 
triangulated the scan of evaluations by having another 
researcher, new to CARE, categorize the data as well.  The 
two scans did not match up in terms of categorizing 
findings; presumably, identifying priority areas would be 
still more difficult for an individual not thoroughly 
versed in CARE’s emergency response programs). The exercise 
would involve reviewing any evaluation reports from the 
year leading up to that point and prioritizing the 
recommendations listed in each, identifying who should be 
responsible for follow-up for each of the recommendations.  
The synthesis would be prepared for planning meetings in 
January and would not exceed 10 pages. 
 
4. Cover sheet for evaluation reports that can feed into 
a searchable database: Individuals perceive evaluation 
reports as too cumbersome to be practical for incorporating 
specific lessons-learned.  The reports are lengthy, and 
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recommendations targeting a specific area, such as human 
resources, get lost among all the other recommendations.  A 
“cover sheet” for evaluation reports, to be completed 
eventually by the evaluator preparing the initial report, 
would categorize lessons-learned into areas of specialty, 
such as human resources, external relations, procurement, 
etc, so as to facilitate the use of the report findings by 
individuals who are responsible only for a slice of the 
findings.  Though the evaluation reports are now easily 
accessed in their Livelink location, it is more of a 
repository than a database.  A database would allow 
searching by region, or disaster type, or by job sector, 
specifically: human resources/personnel, finance, 
procurement/logistics, advocacy, security, and 
monitoring/evaluation. 
How: Potentially, such a cover sheet could eventually be 
incorporated into a searchable database allowing users to 
search for evaluation reports containing information 
relevant to their jobs.  The cover sheet would be no more 
than two pages long and the evaluator submitting the report 
would complete the cover sheet.  Topics included on the 
sheet: 
o Short abstract of the emergency context 
o Time frame of the response and evaluation(s) 
o Country & Region 
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o Sector(s) 
o Type of evaluation (AAR, RTE, joint evaluation, 
etc.) 
o Type of emergency (conflict, natural disaster, slow-
onset, etc.)  
o Lessons-learned categorized by job function 
(logistics, procurement, human resources, external 
relations, etc.) 
 
5. Policy on internal vs. external evaluators: The 
interviewees, when queried about the plusses and minuses of 
using internal versus external evaluators (internal to CARE 
vs. external to CARE), responded predictably that while 
external evaluators sometimes have too large a learning 
curve in terms of understanding how CARE works, they bring 
a fresh perspective.   Internal evaluators, on the other 
hand, know how CARE is structured but can be in a 
politically awkward situation within the organization or 
can lack perspective.  They may not always ask the tough 
questions.  Most interviewees agreed that a team of 
evaluators, internal and external, is ideal when possible.  
Creating a “bank” of external evaluators who are familiar 
with CARE and who are known to be competent would 
facilitate this.  This already exists, in a way; human 
resources maintains a roster.  The recommendation is that 
this resource be formalized.  
How:    Though “prior CARE experience” is a criterion for 
hiring evaluators, there is a perception among interviewees 
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that there is great disparity between external evaluators 
in terms of their understanding of CARE and their 
experience as evaluators.  Formalizing, even training, a 
group of emergency evaluators could assure that they know 
CARE, know the desired format and content of the 
evaluation, and know how to complete the “cover sheet” (see 
above). 
 
6. Learning opportunities:  Several of the interviewees 
were of the opinion that other countries and regions could 
learn from their emergency response experiences, and vice 
versa.  Inviting staff from other countries and/or regions 
to After Action Reviews, planning meetings, participating 
in evaluations as team members and other such events on a 
rotating basis might enable valuable sharing and 
reflection.  
How:   Budget for at least one individual from a 
neighboring region’s CARE office to sit in on each After 
Action Review.  Share that individual’s reflections and 
reactions widely. Also, systematically translate evaluation 
reports into French and Spanish.   
7. Clarify language for “lessons-learned,” “findings,” 
“recommendations,” “best practices,” and the like. In some 
evaluation reports, findings and lessons-learned are two 
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different things; in others, recommendations differ 
(follow) from lessons-learned.  “Best practices” and 
‘lessons learned” are not so different, Patton reminds us 
(2001).  This is not an issue unique to CARE, certainly6, 
but certainly greater specificity of language would help to 
foster a better learning culture.  There were numerous 
comments in the interviews indicating confusion about who 
is responsible to see that evaluation recommendations are 
carried out.  This suggests that “lessons-learned” is a 
misnomer, and that “recommendations” is more accurate. 
Furthermore, perhaps a format specifying how to execute the 
recommendation and who is logically responsible for seeing 
it through would make it easier to trace.   
 
Further Study 
 
This study was limited to one division of one INGO, 
and relied on personal recollection of evaluations that had 
already taken place. Certainly, comparing two or more NGOs 
would be a rich way of identifying where commonalities in 
trends of influence might lie.  It would also be 
interesting within one organization to study an evaluation 
from its inception through a period of time following the 
                                                   
6 World Vision International compiled an internal document, a master 
list of the year’s “lessons-learned” in 2006.  The list had two 
columns: the first was the lesson learned, and the second was a 
recommendation for how to act on the lesson learned. 
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final evaluation, or even through another emergency.  The 
study was limited in that the available data represented 
only one example where there were two separate emergencies 
within the time period of study, allowing for observation 
of which recommendations resurfaced and which seemed to 
have been addressed.   It would be interesting and 
valuable, also, to take Henry and Mark’s framework as it 
applies to humanitarian aid agencies, and to use it to plan 
an evaluation with the framework as a basis with the intent 
of maximizing the influence that the evaluation will have, 
and then trace whether it is in fact possible to plan an 
evaluation to have greater influence. 
Conclusion 
Evaluations of humanitarian aid missions have the 
potential to affirm and bolster staff morale, discover and 
increase good practices, and highlight areas for 
improvement.  CARE has experience with effective evaluation 
utilization, and with some changes to its structures and 
systems, has the capacity to encourage a culture of 
learning while putting the framework in place for improved 
practice.  Annual prioritization and synthesis of lessons-
learned, a searchable database, standardized evaluations 
and reviews, and increased learning opportunities are 
simple steps that can lead to a host of practical 
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improvements and attitude shifts, as indeed evaluations 
already have in isolated instances.  Expanding the 
definition of evaluation use to influence, allowing for 
unintended and indirect forms of influence, reveals 
important ways in which evaluations add value to the 
humanitarian aid agency’s practice. Understanding these 
patterns of influence better, by identifying how they link 
and form pathways, shows in this case that evaluations can, 
with planning, have even greater influence and bring out 
the latent potential of the agency’s learning cycle.   
It is sure that NGOs are being held to ever-greater 
standards of accountability, and organizations are even 
popping up to help them to do so.  It is less apparent 
whether these tightening standards are resulting in 
evaluations that help a policy or program do its job 
better; that is, make the world a better place.  
Development of a theory of evaluation influence for 
humanitarian assistance context takes a step toward 
advancing theories of use and influence into a practical 
means of planning for and implementing evaluations.  In the 
world of humanitarian relief, this could mean better 
practice and saved lives. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
LIST OF EVALUATIONS REVIEWED 
 
TITLE DATE TYPE NOTES 
1. Evaluation of 
CARE 
Afghanistan’s 
Emergency 
Response 
Sept 
2002 
Final 
Evaluation 
One external, 
one internal 
evaluator; 
site visit, 
document 
analysis, 
interviews of 
CARE staff and 
beneficiaries; 
64 pages 
2. Independent 
Evaluation of 
CARE’s 
Humanitarian 
Response to 
flooding 
Resulting from 
Tropical Storm 
Jeanne in Haiti 
March 
2005 
Final 
Evaluation 
Two external  
evaluators and 
one internal 
evaluator; 
document 
review, field 
visits and 
observations, 
semi-
structured 
interviews and 
focus groups; 
28 pages  
3. Joint 
Independent 
evaluation of 
the Humanitarian 
Re3sponse of 
CARE, CRS, Save 
the Children and 
World Vision to 
the 2005 Food 
Crisis in the 
Republic of 
Niger 
Nov 
2005 
Final 
Evaluation / 
MAE 
Six 
evaluators, 
two internal; 
document 
review, 
observation 
and semi-
structured 
interviews and 
focus groups; 
40 pages 
4. Final Report, 
CARE 
International’s 
Humanitarian 
Response to the 
Darfur Crisis 
June 
2004 
RTE Internal 
evaluator; 
interviews and 
document 
review; 13 
pages 
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5. Executive 
Summary and List 
of 
Recommendations, 
CARE 
International’s 
Humanitarian 
Response to the 
Iraq Conflict 
Sept 
2003 
RTE Three internal 
evaluators; 
6. CARE 
International 
Real-Time 
Evaluation of 
the West Bank-
Gaza Crisis 
May 
2002 
RTE Internal 
evaluator; 10 
pages 
7. Food emergency, 
Southern Africa: 
Lessons Learned 
Workshop Report 
June 
2003 
AAR Group sharing 
sessions, SWOT 
analysis, 
intro to 
SPHERE as a 
monitoring and 
evaluation 
tool; 10 pages 
8. Sri Lanka and 
India Multi-
agency 
Evaluation 
July 
2005 
Final 
Evaluation/ 
MAE 
Team of 5 
evaluators, 
including an 
external 
evaluator as 
team leader; 
52 pages 
9. Multi-Agency 
Evaluation of 
Tsunami 
Response: 
Thailand and 
Indonesia 
July 
2005 
Final 
Evaluation/ 
MAE 
Team of 5 
evaluators, 
including an 
external 
evaluator as 
team leader; 
document 
review, focus 
groups and 
interviews; 62 
pages 
10 CARE West Bank 
and Gaza 
emergency 
Programme 
Strategic Review 
May 
2004 
Final 
Evaluation 
Team of 6 
evaluators; 
interviews, 
focus groups, 
observation; 
78 pages 
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11 Lessons Learned 
Workshop, CARE 
Ethiopia 
Oct 
2003 
AAR Group sessions 
based on a 
2000 lessons-
learned 
report; one-
day workshop 
12 CARE Ethiopia 
Lessons Learned 
from Year 2000 
Emergency 
Operation 
Dec 
2001 
Final Report 33 ages 
13 Hurricane 
Jeanne: CARE 
Haiti’s Response 
to the emergency 
lessons Learned 
Workshop / After 
Action Review 
Jan 
2005 
AAR Internal 
facilitator; 
chronology of 
events, small 
working 
groups; 
lessons-
learned 
divided into 
positive and 
negative; 24 
pages 
14 India Earthquake 
Executive 
Summary 
March 
2001 
Final Report 43 pages 
15 Kosovo Crisis 
Lessons Learned 
Review 
 AAR 61 pages 
16 India Tsunami 
Response After 
Action Review 
April 
2005 
AAR 2 days of 
reflections 
with selected 
staff; desk 
review, gender 
audit and 
quantitative 
survey;  24 
pages (60+ 
pages with 
annexes) 
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17 CARE 
International in 
Indonesia, Aceh 
Tsunami Response 
After Action 
Review Workshop 
April 
2005 
AAR  
18 Tsunami After 
Action review, 
Garowe 
March 
2005 
AAR  
19 Tsunami After 
Action Review, 
Colombo 
2005 AAR 3 days, 
lessons 
learned 
session plus 
concepts and 
approaches 
sessions – 44 
attendees 
20 Tsunami After 
Action Review, 
Thailand 
2005 AAR  
21 Lessons Learned 
Workshop, Niamey 
– Executive 
summary 
2005 AAR  
22 Main Lessons 
Learned, 
CEG/CARE Sudan 
Engagement 
Dec 
2005 
Final 
Evaluation 
External 
evaluator ; 
this “main 
lessons” 
document 10 
pages long 
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APPENDIX B 
MATRIX OF LESSONS-LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
AREA OF FOCUS Lesson Learned or Recommendation 
1. A CARE Haiti gender policy with 
strategies and guidelines would be 
useful. –Haiti 2005 
2. Develop documentation to inform 
communities of changes in intervention, 
such as food distribution.  
 
3. CARE staff identified needs rapidly 
with communities from the start and 
worked with coordination community to 
organize a response to those needs.  
This should be replicated.–Haiti AAR 
2005 
Beneficiaries 
4. Train community youths in repair and 
maintenance of hand pumps and provide 
repair kits to each trained youth.  
 
5. Psychosocial programming for adults 
should be very closely tied to viable 
livelihoods and housing programs – 
group counseling sessions and linking 
therapy to other community 
interventions should be emphasized.  
 
6. Both CARE and World Vision should 
consider including alcoholism 
prevention and counseling components 
into their psycho-social programming.  
 
7. Be sensitive to the needs and views of 
the affected community when building 
shelters in India.  
 
8. Urgent -- undertake repairs to all the 
soak pits in India. 
 
9. Undertake research and study to develop 
guidelines for ensuring community-
driven response. 
 
–India and Sri Lanka MAE 2005 
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10. Urgent – watsan improvement in 
settlements.  
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005 
11. Beneficiary selection can be 
improved through a long-range approach 
rather than a short-term or interim 
approach. Also – coordination with 
other agencies on this is desirable.  
–WBG Strat Review 2004 
12. Communities were not directly 
involved in the planning of emergency 
responses.  
 
13. Government obstacles to 
beneficiary selection 
 
–Ethiopia LL 2000 
14. Improve targeting mechanisms to 
account for environment with high level 
of uncertainty and unreliability in 
terms of relief.  
 
15. Build in community contribution 
and participation whenever possible 
 
–South Africa LL 2003 
16. Involve informal women leaders and 
indigenous people with community and 
local knowledge in the planning, 
distribution, forwarding, receiving, 
and benefit of project inputs.  
-India Tsunami AAR 
17. Ensure that communities 
participate meaningfully in relief from 
day 1.  
–Indonesia/Aceh AAR 
18. Needs assessments did not always 
capture the communities’ changing 
needs. If necessary, second needs 
assessments should be developed.  
 
19. There was community fatigue 
regarding assessments. Coordinate 
better in the future. 
 
 –Garowe AAR 
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20. Need for better definition of 
“affected communities” and better 
identification of beneficiaries.  
 
21. Staff should enter villages with a 
process of community analysis rather 
than a prescribed set of actions.  
 
–Thailand AAR 
1. Contingency planning should occur and 
should include a plan for terrorist 
attacks.  
–Afghanistan 2002 
2. Recommendation for using development 
programming to enhance both 
preparedness and prevention.  
– Haiti 2005 
3. Warning system is adequate, but 
action/response late and under-scale.  
– Niger MAE 2005 
4. Develop risk management plan and adapt 
EPP procedures and guidelines. 
 
5. When [the emergency] hit, there was an 
early warning system for drought only.  
In this future, this should be 
expanded, based on risk assessment.  
 
–Haiti AAR 2005 
6. CARE must find a balance between 
participatory approaches/relying on 
local capacity and fast, scaled-up 
response.  
 
7. CARE needs to build technical 
competence and credibility in shelter 
provision in India. 
–Sri Lanka and India MAE 2005 
Preparedness 
and Planning 
8. Develop national organizational 
disaster preparedness plans which 
include strategies for attaining access 
to remote populations; include HR 
requirements, also.  
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005 
166 
 
9. Explore with local NGOs possibilities 
for capacity sharing in disaster risk 
reduction.  
 
10. Support capacity development for 
government at all levels for disaster 
risk reduction and disaster management. 
 
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005 
11. Build vulnerability reduction into 
food security planning. 
12. Trained “emergency core staff” 
should take a lead in developing (and 
periodically updating) the emergency 
preparedness plan (EPP) along with 
other staff.  
-WBG Strat Review 2004 
13. Lack of method in entry and exit 
strategies.  
–Ethiopia LL workshop 2003 
14. Planning framework should 
proactively address environmental 
concerns.  
–Kenya RAP 2001 
15. Exploit opportunities to work with 
the private sector as a business 
partner and as a development partner 
during emergencies.  
–South Africa LL 2003 
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16. Refugee and other population 
movements are hard to predict; 
contingency plans should therefore be 
made for even the less likely 
scenarios.  
 
17. CARE should nominate a person to 
ensure that regular analysis and 
scenario planning for the countries in 
the Balkans region is carried out. 
 
18. CARE field staff should be briefed 
to observe the Red Cross CoC and the 
SPHERE standards. 
 
19. CARE should consider producing a 
simple project checklist for program 
managers in emergencies.  
 
–Kosovo LLR 
20. We should develop a CO –specific 
contingency plan to avoid being caught 
off-guard in the future.  
–Sri Lanka AAR 
21. There is a need to develop 
emergency procedures and staff guidance 
for procurement.  
– Haiti 2005 
22. Emergencies personnel deployed to 
the field should have access to a 4x4 
vehicle with driver and interpreter  
–West Bank/Gaza RTE 2002 
1. Examine and assess procurement and 
logistics system in Sri Lanka.  
 
2. Develop CARE and WV’s capacity to 
handle procurement, warehousing and 
logistics into a common pool for faster 
response.   
 
–India and Sri Lanka MAE 2005 
Procurement 
and Logistics 
3. Investigate possibilities for 
collaboration (among agencies) on 
procurement and capacity development 
for local marketing systems.  
–Indonesia and Thailand MAE 2005 
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4. The purchase of materials has been most 
efficient where beneficiaries and CARE 
have made bulk purchases.  
 
5. CARE WBG needs to make strategic 
decisions regarding its current deep 
involvement in procurement activities, 
related to questions about impact and 
appropriateness. 
 
6. Longer-term planning and an exit 
strategy need to be designed in WBG re: 
procurement.  
 
–WBG Strat Review 
7. There is a need to select, stay with 
and insist on the utilization of a 
single commodity management system – 
either GIMS or Scala.   
–India earthquake 2001 
8. CARE should develop a permanent 
procurement capacity, located in 
Europe, for supporting future emergency 
response. 
 
9. Emergency missions should have an 
overall coordinator who can supervise 
logistic procedures and ensure smooth 
links between procurement, transport of 
goods and warehousing.  
 
–Kosovo LLR 
10. Vendor lists for materials 
according to centers of excellence 
needs to be prepared and updated 
regularly. 
11. Huge increase in procurement needs 
means restructuring is necessary, not 
merely additional staff. 
 
12. Pre-arrangement of transport is 
critical.  
 
–Indonesia/Aceh AAR 
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1. If time allows, use an external person 
to assess CO financial management and 
user requirements.  
-Iraq RTE II 2003 
2. Structured, formal procedures specific 
to emergencies could prevent disregard 
for normal procedures, such as 
purchases without purchase orders.  
–Haiti AAR 2005 
3. Ensure that funds are efficiently used. 
–Thailand  and Indonesia MAE 2005 
4. Administration and finance staff should 
try and make regular visits to field 
offices. This is especially important 
for understanding operating constraints 
during emergencies.  
–West Bank/Gaza Strat Review 2004 
5. CARE should ensure that a finance 
manager is included at the start of all 
emergency operations.  
–Kosovo LLR 
6. There is a need to safeguard against 
overtaxing senior country office staff 
in trying to accommodate CARE 
information needs.  
-Afghanistan 2002 
Finance 
7. A closer examination of current 
division of labor and staff efficiency 
/ motivation would be useful in light 
of the increased workload resulting 
from disaster.   
-Haiti 2002 
 13. If a CO lacks finance officers 
with appropriate experience, CARE 
should send a specialist for large-
scale emergency operations.  
 
14. CARE should ensure that CERT 
finance officers know the accounts 
software. 
 
–Afghanistan 2002 
 15. There was a damaging mis- or 
under-utilization of standard CARE 
accounting procedures.  
-Haiti 2005 
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1. Review and improve staff living 
conditions as necessary to a reasonable 
level. 
 
2. Ensure that counseling services are 
available for returning staff that have 
been exposed to stressful situations.  
– Darfur RTE I 2004 
3. COs hosting a CERT should ensure 
adequate living and office arrangements 
for CERT that should facilitate team-
building between the CERT and the CO.   
–Iraq RTE II 2003 
4. Affected staff had to wait 4 months to 
get psychosocial support.  
–Haiti AAR 2005 
5. Given the high potential for mental 
health disorders, consider immediate 
additional means of support.  
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005 
6. When staff are under severe 
stress…management should pay close 
attention to morale, through 
encouragement and practical support. – 
 
7. CARE should continue the good practice 
of providing professional counselors 
during emergencies. 
 
-Kosovo LLR 
Psychology and 
staff wellness 
8. Include psychosocial care for staff 
engaged in emergency response at all 
levels. 
–India Tsunami AAR 
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1. CI needs to define responsibilities and 
standards for maintaining an acceptable 
telecommunications policy.   
 
2. Communications need to be recognized 
within CI as a priority both for 
security and operations; a minimum 
acceptable capacity needs to be 
defined.   
 
3. Ensure staff are trained in the use of 
communications equipment and systems.   
 
--Iraq RTE II 2003 
4. Put in place a strategy to disseminate 
information up to the CI level.  
–Haiti AAR 2005 
Communication 
5. CARE should ensure that it always has 
full communications from the start of 
an emergency. 
 
6. Strict procedures for telephone use 
should be set up from the start of a 
mission. 
1. Having a security chain and functioning 
communication at the institutional 
level was essential for crisis 
management.  
–Haiti AAR 2005 
2. CARE should require all country offices 
to develop and update security 
management plans.  
 
3. CARE should train security officers to 
understand their role. 
 
4. Security decisions are best made by the 
staff in the field. - -Afghanistan 2002 
Security 
5. COs should ensure that security and 
safety plans are in place at the 
beginning of an emergency and are 
regularly updated.  
-Darfur RTE I 2004 
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6. The issuing of ID cards and having a 
“full-fare, open return economy” air 
ticket are security issues and must be 
applied in forthcoming CERT 
deployments.  
–West Bank/Gaza RTE 2002 
7. CARE should ensure that all vehicles in 
emergencies are equipped with basic 
medical kits and equipment for dealing 
with vehicle accidents.  
–Kosovo LLR 
1. Develop documentation to orient staff 
to intervention strategies such as food 
distribution.  
 
2. Establish ToR before hiring any 
consultant or contractor. 
 
3. In the future, re: international staff, 
we should identify genuine needs, 
define ToRs, and regularly update the 
human resources bank. 
–Haiti AAR 2005 
Human 
Resources 
4. CARE International should train local 
staff in emergency mgmt skills, 
especially during lulls.   
 
5. All staff deployed in an emergency 
should have a ToR agreed to in advance 
with the CO.  CARE should develop 
standard ToRs for each of the CERT 
posts.   
 
6. CARE must ensure that staff on the CERT 
roster are highly qualified and can add 
value to the response. 
 
7. –Afghanistan 2002 
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8. Articulate a more strategic approach to 
CERT skills selection and deployment in 
the CI Emergency Manual. 
 
9. Clarify timeframe for CERT to make it 
more flexible and responsive to actual 
needs 
 
10. Review and revision of generic 
ToRs for CERT members  
 
11. Develop and implement a training 
program for CERT staff that includes 
coaching/mentoring techniques 
 
– Iraq RTE II 2003 
8. Matching criteria for selection of CERT 
personnel should be sensitive to the 
issue of ‘nationalism’  
 
9. CERTs must be prepared for almost total 
self-sufficiency. 
 
10. COs must be capacitated to know 
what to expect of a CERT team if one is 
deployed to their country 
–West Bank/Gaza RTE 2002 
11. In all major disasters, deploy HR 
staff in the field offices in the early 
stages to enable local recruitment.  
 
12. Ensure that in-country disaster 
preparedness capacity and plans are 
reinforced with a strong component of 
international and regional expertise so 
that COs are able to scale up response 
quickly by deploying optimum staff.  
–India and Sri Lanka MAE 2005 
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13. Expand the collaboration potential 
for regularized multi-agency training 
in cross-agency areas of relevance.  
 
14. Strengthen human resources 
policies to overcome barriers to human 
resource constraints and optimal 
performance 
 
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005 
15. CARE should set up and train a 
Country Office core team in emergency 
response.  
–WBG Strat Review 2004 
16. Shadow roles and number and types 
of staff needed at any given time 
should be outlined before each 
emergency response. –Ethiopia LL 2000 
17. Early deployment priorities should 
include the rapid establishment of 
communications systems and setup of 
adequate accommodations for CARE staff. 
 
18. CARE assessment teams should be 
gender balanced; PRA training would be 
a plus. 
 
–India Earthquake 2001 
19. Invest in staff and support 
systems at the onset of an emergency.  
–South Africa LL 2003 
20. When personnel change, a proper 
hand-over of responsibilities is 
essential, to ensure that the newcomer 
is fully briefed about the job and is 
able to benefit from the outgoing post-
holder’s knowledge, experience and 
professional contacts. 
 
21. Mission Directors and human 
resource managers should ensure that 
all staff receive a job description.  
 
–Kosovo LLR 
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22. Brief and train emergency officers 
and partner staff in participatory and 
gender analysis tools.  
 
23. Recruit female staff and 
volunteers for assessments and other 
responses. 
 
24. Performance management of the 
deployed staff needs to be incorporated 
within the Annual Performance Appraisal 
process. Reward and recognition of 
deployed staff needs to be developed. 
–India Tsunami AAR 
25. Use generalists with flexibility 
to fill gaps. 
 
26. Strong HR needed at all levels.  
 
–Indonesia and Aceh Tsunami AAR 
27. HR should be involved in the 
proposal development stage to assist in 
staff recruitment. 
 
28. HR should prepare an in-house list 
of staff expertise available and 
develop an emergency roster.  
 
–Garowe AAR 
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29. CARE Sri Lanka HR should make 
regular visits to field offices to 
communicate change processes and listen 
to staff concerns.  
 
30. We need to find ways to build 
local HR capacity and facilitate 
regional recruitment.  
 
31. HR to monitor conditions of 
inequity and ensure staff concerns are 
heard. 
 
32. CI should maintain an active 
roster of CVs of people who can be 
called upon when an emergency arises. 
 
33. CARE USA should dedicate a full-
time person to emergency recruitment 
and placement in emergency situations.  
 
–Sri Lanka AAR 
34. Better define the profiles and 
competencies needed for personnel 
engaged in emergency operations, 
including data management officers and 
warehouse managers.  
 
35. Train CARE personnel in EPP and 
existing protocols  
--Niamey AAR 2005 
36. At least one senior decision-maker 
should visit at the beginning of an 
emergency operation to aid 
communication.  
–Afghanistan 2002 
37. Senior staff should visit crisis 
areas early and regularly. 
–Darfur RTE 2004 
 38. We need to build capacity in the 
field to decentralize to regional 
offices by enhancing the authority 
level. –Sri Lanka AAR 
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 39. Visits by senior management should 
take place as close to the beginning of 
an emergency as possible. 
 
Iraq RTE II 2003 
40. Apply new information management 
procedures as soon as possible.  
–West Bank/Gaza RTE 2002 
41. Info management is critical in an 
emergency and must be developed prior 
to a disaster.  
–India Earthquake 2001 
1. Establish MIS inventory to identify 
what type of information is already 
being collected and how, and what 
information is/is not available.  
–South Africa LL 2003 
Information 
Management 
2. CARE, UN agencies, donors and govt need 
to establish clear reporting lines, 
managed by a centralized body using a 
standard format.  
–South Africa LL 2003 
Policy and 
Advocacy 
3. Contingency plan should address what 
advocacy issues CARE should raise.  
 
4. CERT should deploy an advocacy 
specialist early in an emergency 
response if there is not an individual 
with this expertise on the ground 
already. 
-Afghanistan 2002 
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5. Critical capacities, such as advocacy 
and policy analysis, should not be 
attached to ad hoc structures.  
 
6. Add an advocacy and policy analysis 
“box” to the aCERT organigram and 
identify a focal point from within CI 
membership to take on responsibility 
for developing and maintaining the 
required capacity.   
 
7. CARE should aim to develop a more 
focused strategy on advocacy during 
emergencies via a CO or CERT focal 
point.   
 
8. There should be an understanding that 
the preparation of scripts for 
congressional testimonies or other 
high-level representation be done in 
close consultation with the CO.  --Iraq 
RTE II 2003 
1. Devote additional resources to 
advocacy.  
 
2. Advocacy for land rights. 
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005 
3. Advocacy on the right to access to 
adequate quality and quantity of water  
 
4. Advocacy should be professional, should 
be based on our own work and direct 
experience. 
 
5. Legal advice in terms of RBA is needed 
 
–WBG Strat Review 2004 
6. A key CARE role should be advocacy for 
disaster victims to inform them about 
their rights for relief and 
rehabilitation.   
–India earthquake 2001 
7. CARE should agree on a global policy 
defining its relationship with the 
military.  
-Kosovo LLR 
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8. Appeals and SitReps were important 
advocacy tools with donors and lead 
CARE bodies; the appeal mechanism 
should be institutionalized.  
-India Tsunami AAR 
9. Develop an advocacy strategy for the 
emergency response. –Niamey AAR 2005 
10. CARE Lead Members should state the 
lines of authority at the beginning of 
an operation.  
–Afghanistan 2002 
11. The CO should have an emergency 
contingency plan with clear 
responsibilities and lines of 
communication laid out. –Haiti 2005 
1. Develop training program for CERT staff 
that includes exposure to a variety of 
operations within various COs, 
especially different financial and 
administrative systems. 
 
2. A senior CI staff representative should 
facilitate adjustments and/or 
clarifications of roles and 
responsibilities of CO and CERT staff.  
 
-Iraq RTE II 2003 
3. Plan a meeting of all program staff 
immediately after a disaster to 
delegate and clarify each person’s 
tasks.  
–Haiti AAR 2005 
Decision 
Making 
4. Set up a contingency emergency plan 
that is pyramidal; ensure communication 
about the new structure and involve the 
community in decision-making. 
 
5. At the beginning, lines of 
responsibility and leadership for 
managing the emergency were not well 
established, leading to frustration and 
delays.  
 
–Haiti AAR 2005 
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6. Reporting lines within a CO should be 
re-articulated as soon as possible 
after arrival of external emergency 
response personnel  
–West Bank/Gaza RTE 2002 
7. Ensure senior managers in CO and 
districts take responsibility for and 
participate in all coordination fora  
– India and Sri Lanka MAE 2005  
8. We need a common position…the problem 
is to know who does and decides what in 
the CARE network.  We need someone to 
prepare (an advocacy) paper, circulate 
it, and get agreement.  
–WBG Strat Review 2004 
9. Roles and responsibilities of 
representatives should be clearly 
defined before emergency ops to promote 
clear understanding of roles; validate 
at time of emergency. 
 –Ethiopia LL 2000 
10. CARE, UN agencies, donors and govt 
need to establish clear reporting 
lines, managed by a centralized body 
using a standard format.  
–South Africa LL 2003 
11. Lead or Temporary Coordinating 
Member and their country offices should 
take responsibility for monitoring 
potential emergencies; CARE should 
decide where responsibility lies for 
analysis and contingency planning when 
there is no Lead or Coordinating 
member.   
 
12. Project managers should be briefed 
on all their responsibilities, and 
preferably equipped with a checklist of 
these.   
 
-Kosovo LLR 
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13. Clarify decision making structure. 
 
14. There should be proper authority 
delegation to make decisions at the 
field level.  
 
–Garowe AAR 
15. Delegation of authority to field 
offices in the early phases has been 
empowering for staff. We need to ensure 
the delegation of authority is 
systematized.  
–Sri Lanka AAR 
16. Define and clarify the roles and 
responsibilities, in terms of 
preparation, response, communication, 
and training, of CO, CARE USA, CEG, and 
CI.  
–Niamey AAR 2005 
1. CARE International should include 
application of lessons previously 
learned in future ToRs.  
 
2. CARE should audit emergency operations 
within 3 to 4 months of the start of 
the operation.    
 
-Afghanistan 2002 
3. CARE should make use of the Sudan 
experience to develop a “good practice” 
guide for humanitarian protection 
activities. 
 
4. Ensure that adequate resources for 
learning are built into project budgets 
to improve timeliness and effectiveness 
of M&E events.   
 
-–Darfur RTE I 2004 
Evaluation and 
Learning 
1. Encourage COs to allocate adequate 
resources in project budgets to cover 
costs for lessons-learned sessions and 
M&E activities.  
– Iraq RTE II 2003 
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2. We should promote a culture of 
continuous reflection and willingness 
to make modifications… 
 
3. We should identify a focal point for 
early collection, processing and 
analysis of data. 
 
4. SPHERE standards should be adopted and 
applied in the future.  
 
-Haiti AAR 2005 
5. How can CARE disseminate and share 
learning from successful shelter work 
in Sri Lanka?  
 
6. Ongoing monitoring of watsan data in 
India will be important. 
 
–Sri Lanka/India MAE 2005 
7. The Inter-Agency Working Group should 
look into putting monitoring expertise 
on the ground in the early stages of an 
emergency to assist with establishing 
M&E systems.  
–Thailand and Indonesia MAE 2005 
8. Improve the level of household-level 
qualitative analysis. 
 
9. Improve monitoring o f impact in 
projects by including indicators, peer 
and inter-agency reviews, etc., and 
staff training in these methods.   
 
–WBG Strat Review 2004 
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10. Need for methodology / clear 
guideline for monitoring food 
distribution activities.  
 
11. During impact evaluation, CARE 
should study whether beneficiaries felt 
that the food aid they received was 
appropriate or not. 
 
12. Absence of guidelines for 
evaluating emergency response limited 
initial learning and assessment of 
impact and further impacts design of 
future interventions  
 
–Ethiopia LL 2000 
13. Assessment of needs should also 
include the assessment of local 
capacities and coping mechanisms to 
inform and guide external 
interventions.  
– India earthquake 2001 
14. Establish a DM&E unit and a DM&E 
coordinator at a CARE CO level, as well 
as M&E Manager at a project level.  
 
15. Establish standard formats for M&E 
systems across projects. 
 
16. Project budgets should include the 
cost of a full time DM&E manager and 
shared costs of DM&E coordinator.  
 
17. Include field-based learning 
events for CARE and partners in project 
design and budget  
 
–South Africa LL 2003 
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18. CARE needs to insist, with donors 
and amongst its members, on rigorous 
assessment before committing itself to 
an emergency program.  
 
19. CARE projects need to be 
accompanied by an effective system that 
regularly assesses the impact of its 
activities in beneficiaries.  
 
20. CARE members should do their own 
internal evaluations as to which 
sectors of their recruitment performed 
well and which less well, with a view 
to making improvements as necessary. –
Kosovo LLR 
21. Collect and solicit data 
disaggregated by sex to understand 
composition of surviving families.  
 
22. Assessment reports should reflect 
the needs for different phases. 
 
23. Capture the lessons learnt in the 
current and previous disasters to form 
a base for future programming.  
 
24. Monitoring should include impact 
indicators.  
 
–India tsunami AAR 
25. Thus far we are consistently 
monitoring at the output level only. We 
should more consistently collect and 
analyze quality data. 
 
26. Develop M&E framework / strategy 
for working in emergencies.  
 
-Sri Lanka AAR 
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 27. There should be a formal process 
of sharing experiences with other 
organizations working on the tsunami 
response. 
 
28. Clear achievement indicators and 
reporting formats are needed  
 
–Thailand AAR 
 29. Establish and reinforce monitoring 
and evaluation in emergency plans.  
 
30. Develop a working group that will 
assure the utilization of lessons 
learned and the development of a 
nutrition strategy for crisis and non-
crisis periods. 
 
–Niamey AAR 2005 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
Interview Protocol, Use of Evaluations 
 
1. From your perspective, what are the critical events 
where planning takes place? 
 
a. What are the major meetings, workshops, retreats, 
etc., where planning takes place for your job? 
 
b. From your perspective, at what key events does 
planning take place for CARE as a whole? 
 
c. Is most planning done in a routine, regular 
fashion, or are there ad hoc meetings where major 
planning occurs? Explain.  
 
2.  Who are the main participants for the key planning 
events you described? 
  
a. Who organizes the events? 
  
b. Who facilitates the events? 
 
c. Who determines the content of the events? 
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d. Who is present for the events? 
 
3. Where do these events tend to occur? How long do they 
last? 
 
4. During these key meetings, routine or ad-hoc, has the 
discussion included emergency response or capacity 
building? 
  
 a. On a policy level? 
   
  i. If so, what was the context? 
   
  ii. If so, were any decisions made on a policy 
level? 
 
 b. On an operations level? 
 
  i. If so, what was the context? 
 
  ii. If so, were any decisions made on an 
operations level? 
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c. When it is necessary to decide between several 
courses of action, how do you prioritize what to 
focus on? 
 
5. Are evaluation findings an information source for these 
planning events? 
 
a. do you regularly receive or have easy access to 
evaluation findings from disasters and emergencies? 
Where would you go to find such information if you 
wanted it? 
 
b. Are “lessons learned” incorporated into discussions 
about the future at major planning events? 
c. Do certain “lessons” or types of lessons get used 
more than others? If so, why and how? 
 
d. Have you been involved in any disaster or 
emergency-related evaluations?  
 
 i. If so, what was the context and what was your 
role? 
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ii. If so, were you enthusiastic about the 
impending evaluation, or were you reluctant? Why? 
  
6. Are lessons-learned being used appropriately and to 
effect for planning? If not, how could this be improved? 
  
a. do the appropriate people have access to lessons-
learned? 
  
b. are lessons-learned put in a format that is easy to 
use and understand? If not, what would help? 
 
c. are lessons learned received  in a format that is 
easy to read and use? If not, how would you change the 
format? 
  
d. is the timing of the delivery of lessons-learned 
such that they are immediately useful? If not, how 
could timing be improved? 
 
7. Do you have other remarks or suggestions for improving 
the use of evaluation reports? 
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